



NATIONAL REVIEW

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January 11, 1956

A WEEKLY JOURNAL OF OPINION

Can Moscow Deliver?

PYRRHO

Witch-Hunting with the Left

FRANCIS J. McNAMARA

Postscript to 'The New Yorker'

JOHN ABBOT CLARK

Articles and Reviews by EDWARD CASE
FRANK S. MEYER . GERHART NIEMEYER . F. A. VOIGT
WILLMOORE KENDALL . ROY CAMPBELL . WM. F. BUCKLEY, JR.



from WASHINGTON *straight*

A NEWSLETTER

SAM M. JONES

Plans For the Farmers

If you have three acres of land and/or sell more than \$150 in agricultural produce per year, you're a farmer. The Bureau of the Census says so. On this basis of computation there are five million farms in the United States. Forty per cent of the farms supply 90 per cent of our total national production of food and fiber. Another 40 per cent yield sustenance for those who work the land. At the bottom of the scale are a million farms that produce less than a thousand dollars a year in income and sustenance.

To solve the perennial farm problem, and answer the political clamor of farm legislators, the President's Advisory Committee on Agriculture has prepared a prescription for a special Presidential message to Congress. It involves a moratorium plan of acreage reduction whereby farmers will receive payment (for compliance with the reduction scheme) in the form of Credit Commodity Corporation warehouse receipts. These certificates will be negotiable at face value. The President is expected to urge bipartisan support as a matter of national economic necessity, but controversy is anticipated in respect to alternative programs. Farm leaders and farm organizations have made intensive studies of agricultural problems, and the proposed solutions will be considered on Capitol Hill along with the White House recommendations.

Better Roads

Despite ample warning by Senator Byrd to mend its financial methods of meeting national road-building requirements, the Administration pressed its original proposal last year—to a thumping defeat by an opposition headed by the Virginian. A new Administration bill, incorporating considerably more orthodox financing methods, is now being submitted. And it is expected to pass this session without material change.

Geneva Aftermath

Russian-born Constantine Boldyreff, one of the leaders of the international anti-Communist underground organization (NTS), told National Review this week that "the West has yet to learn the extent of the damage done by the Geneva conference." Mr. Boldyreff, who recently returned from a six

months secret mission in twelve European and Asiatic countries, added that American VIP's visiting Russia contributed unwittingly to the harm wrought at Geneva.

"The Spirit of Geneva has proved a serious blow to the revolutionary spirit within the Soviet Union," Mr. Boldyreff said. "Total exploitation created a convincing picture of a weak and gullible Western leadership. The photographs of President Eisenhower clasping the bloody hand of Bulganin and the pictures and stories of convivial fraternity displayed by Allied diplomats constituted a terrible triumph of Communist propaganda techniques."

Mr. Boldyreff presented news stories and editorials which carried the implication that Americans realize they must make deals with the Soviet Union on the Kremlin's terms. Boldyreff said that the impressions U.S. visiting officials have made have been grist for the Red mill. "Any error of fact, no matter how trivial or understandable, has been picked up by the Russian and satellite press to discredit the author and buttress the contention that Americans are deceitful. The other edge of this two-bladed weapon is to interpret any friendly comment by Americans as an admission of the superiority of the Communist system. Unfortunately," Mr. Boldyreff concluded, "both Senator Malone and Justice Douglas unwittingly contributed to the Red fabrication by statements which, taken out of context, seem to support the contentions of Moscow's opinion-moulders."

Lausche's Double Entry

Governor Frank Lausche of Ohio, as a candidate for the Senate, presents a serious menace to Republican Senator George Bender's chances for re-election. As a favorite-son candidate, controlling the Ohio Democratic delegation, he may be a formidable factor in the growing coalition of Democratic leaders who would like to stop Stevenson. With the possible exception of the late Bob Taft, Lausche's vote-getting ability has never been equalled in Ohio, and the qualities that have attracted considerable bipartisan support in his own state may well have material influence in national Democratic politics. His double entry strategy adds weight to the opinion of Ohio newsmen that Lausche "is bigger than his party, bigger than either party."

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The WEEK

Some advocates of "coexistence" are more vulnerable than others, and so it is possible that the recent (8.5 per cent) "reduction" of the Soviet Union's military budget will be submitted as evidence that things are getting better. Now entirely aside from the fact that the Soviets are free to manipulate their statistics any way they want, they took the occasion to announce an increase in the outlay for "heavy industries" (in Soviet parlance, armament industries). And the military budget, proper, is still higher than it was in 1954 (18.2 per cent, as against 17.8 per cent). Which is a pretty honest assessment of the intensity the cold war has reached a few months after Geneva; namely, we have "progressed" beyond 1954.

The National Committee for an Effective Congress whose formula for making Congress effective is, roughly speaking, to emasculate it, complained last week that "extremist leaders" of the "radical right," including Senators Knowland, Bridges, Eastland and Jenner, were "launching an intensive effort to recreate an atmosphere of fear and suspicion" in which they "might once again become a dominating political factor." So the Committee has called for a national mobilization of Liberals. To what end? To accomplish what Mr. Joseph Rauh of the ADA yearns for (see "Liberals, Elections and Luxury," p. 7 below): an exciting, democratic competition between candidates who are entirely agreed on every issue.

"Assuming that the record is here correctly cited," writes Elmer Davis (Mr. Nonconformity) in an advertisement for a book called *The Judgment of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg*—quickly adding, "and I have no reason to suppose that it is not, I cannot believe the testimony of Elitcher and the Greenglasses, or much if any of that of Harry Gold." (In other words, Mr. Davis cannot believe the Rosenbergs were guilty.) The author of the book whose accuracy Mr. Davis has no reason to doubt has been identified by a number of witnesses as a Communist; and its publishers, Mr. Angus Cameron and Mr. Carl Aldo Marzani, are both Communists, the latter having spent a couple of years in jail for disguising his membership in the party from security officials in the State Department.

Fourteen Unitarian clergymen declared last week their opposition to a proposal recommending that

moral and religious values be taught in public schools—on the grounds that even a “minimal” teaching of religion as a part of public education would violate the principle of the separation of church and state. This popular superstition about the meaning of the First Amendment begs a question to which religious groups should unequivocally address themselves. That is: if the First Amendment forbids religion being made a part of the curriculum, and if parents believe religion is an essential part of educational experience, then should not the First Amendment be clarified?

Unsound Military Strategy

The sudden increase of a billion-plus in the Defense Department's budget is the visible part of a new, clandestine debate over military policy. The Navy is trying to cut down the strategic duties of the Air Force; the Army, of both Air Force and Navy. Such of the debate as has seeped through the Pentagon's walls is worth listening to.

The Navy rests its case on the obvious insecurity of the Strategic Air Command's refueling bases in North Africa: Col. Nasser's Egypt can no longer be counted on; the British are in trouble in Cyprus; the French have shown an inability, or unwillingness, to keep order in Morocco and Algeria.

Never mind, the Navy men say. It just so happens that, in the new Douglas Skymaster, we have a plane able to take off from water, and needing no landing field. Because it can be refueled at sea, it can fly anywhere in the world. And, mostly because of the Skymaster, the Navy got a modest raise in its appropriations.

The Navy's success seems to have driven Army strategists to creative thought. They argue that when the U.S. agreed to a Korean stalemate, acquiesced in a French surrender at Dienbienphu, and forced Chiang to abandon the Taichens, it telegraphed the Kremlin that the A- and H-bombs would never be used. The Kremlin has demonstrated to itself that little wars pay; why should it take the risks of a great war? Thus, there never will be fission or nuclear war; there will be only little wars, and little wars belong to the Army. And, on this argument, the Army budget was also modestly raised.

The debate, in our opinion, shows once again the impossibility of resting a sound military strategy on a foreign policy of containment—on the Achesonian “positions of strength” to which Mr. Dulles has let himself be pushed. North Africa was once such a position; its value is diminishing by the hour. Korea, Formosa, and Indo-China are points where the USSR is now supposedly being contained; but they also are

diminishing in value, and may presently be outflanked in Burma and Malaya. The great example of containment was prewar France; and its means of containing Germany, the Maginot Line, was a work of military genius. It delayed the German armies for less than a day.

To All Candidates

The next General Assembly of the UN is to be put off until about mid-November of 1956. The main reason for this postponement, the *New York Times* reports, “is to avoid debating such controversial questions as the admission of Communist China in the heat of a Presidential campaign.”

Which makes all the more relevant Senator Knowland's recent challenge to all Presidential candidates of both parties to give an unequivocal answer to the only searching political question: If the UN admits Red China, over our protests, what will you recommend that the U.S. do? It is not enough, bear in mind, for Presidential aspirants to record opposition to admitting Communist China to the UN. For it is obvious that no one who runs for office in this country will declare himself in favor of what about 90 per cent of the electorate vehemently oppose. Rather than piously assert they are against sin, in other words, the candidates will have to tell us what action they suggest in case the UN commits the crowning indecency for which it is apparently preparing itself.

On Pyrrho's Thesis

Pyrrho's analysis of the Soviet economic potential, which we publish in this issue under the title, “Can Moscow Deliver?,” poses in the first place a question of fact. Is the officially accepted estimate of current Soviet economic output correct, or is it, as Pyrrho undertakes to demonstrate, grossly inflated?

The answer has immediate and major bearing on the central issues of international policy now up for decision by Congress, the Administration, and public opinion. If Pyrrho is correct—and the official estimates false—then the following conclusions seem to us inescapable:

1. We give way to ungrounded panic by talking about a massive Soviet foreign aid program, a “Soviet Marshall Plan” as it is being called. The argument that we have to compete with Moscow in pouring out foreign aid is invalid. American foreign aid, economic or military, may in specific cases and for specific purposes be necessary, but it is not needed to forestall huge programs of Soviet foreign aid, because there won't be such programs. The location, size and kind of foreign aid program that we decide to mount

can be justified, therefore, only by *other* reasons, strategic and political.

2. The internal Soviet economy is in such *bad shape* that it needs help from the outside *desperately*; and this need is what prompts Moscow's call for an expansion of trade. It follows that we will strengthen the position of the free world not by yielding to the call but by persuading our allies to join us in tightening and extending the present trade barriers.

3. In our general policy toward the Soviet Union we have no economic ground for negation or timidity, but on the contrary a most favorable basis for a bold offensive.

4. There is something drastically wrong in the way that our official and semi-official intelligence agencies arrive at their findings.

Because these conclusions are of such plenary importance for the nation's security, we believe that Pyrrho's analysis should be submitted to the most searching examination. On our side we are asking scholars and public leaders most intimately concerned with these problems to join in this critique; and we will publish whatever serious comment we receive, either in rebuttal or confirmation of Pyrrho's thesis.

How Fares the UN?

On December 20 last, the General Assembly of the United Nations concluded its tenth annual session. What were the accomplishments of this vast world gathering, this huge outlay of money, talent, energy and time?

The true answer is really extraordinary. Even by the summary of the UN public relations staff, there was only one positive and definite accomplishment during the entire session—just one. And what a one! It was the "package deal": in the final week, sixteen more governments were added to the UN membership. The sixteen included the four Soviet captives, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. By voting to accept these four, the Assembly (and the concurring Security Council) finds them to be, by the terms of the UN Charter, "peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations." This means, also according to the Charter, that these four have "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person."

As for the rest of the session's record, it is as dreary and hollow as it is short. A three months squabble over membership on the Security Council ended on the final day, when the United States abandoned its good ally, the Philippine Republic. Charter revision, due in the tenth year, was postponed to a more "appropriate" time. France walked out after

a vote to interfere in her internal affairs. Consideration of Communist Chinese membership was postponed. Belgium boycotted committee meetings on "non-self-governing" territories. South Africa walked out after a vote to interfere in her internal affairs. The member nations were asked to pay up the overdue funds for refugees. Consideration of the Moroccan question was postponed. No action was taken on the Arab-Israeli crisis. Nothing at all on Peiping's armament build-up off Formosa, on Communist truce violations in Korea and Vietnam, on Communist assassinations in Malaya, on Moscow-directed subversion everywhere. Plenty of talk about colonialism, racialism, capitalist exploitation and the evils of nuclear weapons.

Oh yes. Two other positive accomplishments. 1) A 1956 budget of \$48,566,350 (just for the central UN office, of course: the "specialized agencies" have their scores of millions from other budgets) was unanimously voted. 2) \$30,000 was appropriated to take care of a Korean cemetery for those whose bodies were left there after they fell under the UN banner.

One development of this tenth Assembly session is an augury of much significance for the future. The governments of many new nations—small nations, primitive and underdeveloped nations—are beginning to remind themselves that each delegation in the UN has a single and equal vote. It is hardly any trouble—especially when skilled Communist operators are at hand to help—to piece together a majority against the major nations of Western civilization.

For the Western nations, these absurd majorities are self-created monsters hung by their own hands around their own national necks. The factitious blocs of neo-nationalists, well-meaning idealists, resentful anti-whites, convinced anti-Christians and professional assassins would not even exist apart from the UN, the mechanism of which inflates normal problems into insoluble crises. That the United States, Britain and France should entrust even the smallest part of their own and their civilization's destinies to the solicitude of the Communist usurpers of Albania, Byelorussia and Poland, or to the raw regimes of Yemen, Indonesia and Burma, not to speak of Outer Mongolia in the next installment, is so ludicrous that it would be altogether incredible if it were not true.

Apart from a few globalist fanatics of the Eleanor Roosevelt school, there are not many UN enthusiasts. Its defenders' usual case is restrained: "The UN is doing *some* good, it is moving in the right direction, it is—however deficient in this stage—our *best hope* for peace." But even such modest praise is not confirmed by the evidence. After ten years, and more plainly each year, the UN not only has no positive accomplishment on its record. The truth is much

sharper. The UN is proving to be a definite and often major hindrance to the solution of serious international problems.

When an issue—Kashmir, Israeli-Egyptian skirmishing, *apartheid*, Morocco, refugees, or whatever—gets tangled up in the UN process, it can no longer be limited or localized. It becomes an “international crisis.” The normal methods of traditional diplomacy are blocked. Responsible efforts to conciliate and compromise necessarily give way to propaganda speeches and proposals motivated only by demagoguery. The field is wide open to intrigue and mischief making. It becomes impossible for a nation to “retreat” from a perhaps foolish position taken for some episodic reason in a magnified public debate. Ten years experience, moreover, proves that such are the inevitable consequences of the institutional mechanism of the UN—disregarding altogether its historical tendency as an embryonic “world government” to subvert the freedoms of individual nations that have freedoms.

Congress must pass on our lion's share of the new \$48,566,350 UN budget. With ten UN years now on display, it would be appropriate for Congress, before voting the money, to study with some care the record and its meaning.

At the Old Stand

The New American Right, says the author of a recent rather incoherent piece in the *Progressive*, never existed. It never existed because, first, it was a fiction invented by sociologists, and because, second, it has “passed,” and because, third, everyone, including George Sokolsky himself, agrees that the New Deal is here to stay.

As to the author's major point, NATIONAL REVIEW refuses to be drawn into the argument: none of the recent talk about a “new” Right in America originated in this neck of the political woods, and we have no thesis to plead about it, one way or the other. But the following does seem worth setting down:

There is a Right in American politics.

We are a part of it.

We are proud of the fact that it is *not* new, but as old as the American tradition itself, and rooted therefore in political thinking as old as Plato and Aristotle and Cicero and Augustine.

We do *not* accept the New Deal. We like to think that the native good sense of the American people, which has already struck out against some of its most conspicuous excesses, will one day reassert itself in the repeal of the erroneous premises on which the New Deal was based.

We feel young and healthy, thank you, and like Tom Sawyer will be around to attend the funerals of many who have sought to bury us prematurely.

‘Mrs. FDR and 41 Others’

A day or two before Christmas, “Mrs. FDR and 41 Others” (as the *Daily Worker* headlined the story), addressed a petition to the President asking him to grant amnesty—in the spirit of Christmas—to the sixteen leaders of the Communist Party now serving jail sentences for violating the Smith Act.

The petitioners went out of their way to state that they are “*in fundamental disagreement with the philosophy of the Communist Party* (not with that of ‘communism,’ i.e. socialism, else they’d have lost some good names, e.g. Norman Thomas, Rowland Watts, John Bennett) *and with essential elements in its program*”—a rather undignified concession to the spirit of McCarthyism, it seems to us. What was it, then, that prompted the petition? The petitioners were “motivated in their present action by their intellectual attachment to the democratic way of life.”

As it turns out, the petition discloses a deep contempt for the democratic way of life, and a brazen reliance on the public's dimwittedness in not recognizing that contempt. The contempt of the signers for the democratic process is seen in their attitude toward the democratically arrived at and judicially upheld decision that revolutioneering as practiced by the Communists in question is illegal. In a democracy, the people, subject to restraints of their own choosing, decide what kind of society they want to live in. This particular society decided to prosecute those who are actively engaged in attempting to overturn it.

Those who are prepared to defend democracy must be prepared to execute democracy's decisions; in this case, to implement the sentences handed down against the Communist offenders. Those whose agreement with democracy is contingent on democracy's agreement with them seek to circumvent those of democracy's decisions with which they disagree; in this case, via disingenuous appeals to clemency.

That was perhaps the worst feature of the petition. One recommends clemency when the offender gives evidence of having been regenerated, or when existing laws, for accidental reasons in unusual circumstances, work inordinate hardship on the offender. What Mrs. Roosevelt and her friends were after could not have been clemency in the first sense, for the Communists are unrepentant, and, on their release, will predictably return to the job of subverting our society. Nor are the sentences any tougher than the lawmakers intended they should be. What the petitioners were out to do was simply to render ineffective a law they disapprove of but weren't able to beat by appeals to lawmakers or the people, or by arguments before the Supreme Court.

Among the signers are such stalwart opponents of the Smith Act as John C. Bennett of Union Theological Seminary, Norman Thomas, Rowland Watts of the Workers Defense League, Henry Steele Commager of Columbia, and Elmer Rice. Perhaps because the Smith Act was passed during the reign of Mr. Roosevelt, Mrs. Roosevelt has not, to our knowledge, singled it out for direct attack. But she has done so indirectly on a number of occasions, as her affiliation with the Americans for Democratic Action, long an enemy of the Act, proves. The petition, in short, was nothing more than an effort to solicit Mr. Eisenhower's help in beating the rap.

Liberals, Elections and Luxury

(ADA Division)

(Some extracts from "Meet the Press," December 18. Guest: Joseph L. Rauh, National Chairman, Americans for Democratic Action. Moderator: Ned Brooks. Panel: Lawrence Spivak, Richard Clurman (*Newsday*), Jack Bell (AP), May Craig (Portland Press-Herald). (The italics are added.)

SPIVAK: Mr. Rauh, the ADA supports the Democratic Party, endorses it, most of your leaders are members of the Democratic Party; why then do you keep up the pretense that you're independent and non-partisan?

RAUH: We *are* independent and non-partisan, Mr. Spivak. We look for Republicans to support. We did support in the last election Senator Case—along with, I must say, a vice chairman of the ADA who was running against him. We used to support Senator Morse when he was a Republican, but he did us a dirty trick and became a Democrat.

SPIVAK: Are you saying then, a Republican has to be a Democrat for you to support him?

RAUH: No, he has to be a liberal, Mr. Spivak.

SPIVAK: When you say you supported Case and his opponent, you really are saying that you didn't support either one of them?

RAUH: Well, we say both of them were liberals. We would love elections in which both candidates are liberals. That's a luxury we don't get enough of.

CLURMAN: . . . Mr. Rauh, which of the Democratic candidates, Adlai Stevenson, or Governor Averell Harriman, or Senator Estes Kefauver is ADA going to support?

RAUH: ADA is an organization of a lot of people and the word "democratic" is in the middle of our name, and I simply can't speak for the organization . . . I really don't have any judgment between the three of them, I think they're all fine liberal candidates.

CLURMAN: Since you're an organization dedicated to making the Democratic Party more *liberal*, which of the three do you think is more liberal?

RAUH: We're organized to make *both* parties more liberal. We are having a lot of trouble with the Republican Party now, but we're trying to make both more liberal.

SPIVAK: . . . Would you like to see Chief Justice Warren nominated on the Republican ticket? Would you support him?

RAUH: I think it would be a great luxury for the American people to have Chief Justice Warren on the Republican ticket and have such men as Harriman, Stevenson, or Kefauver on the Democratic ticket: *then we can't lose whatever happens.*

SPIVAK: What would the ADA do, do you think? . . .

RAUH: I'm one of many thousands of members. For me to try to speak on a matter of that importance [sic] would be an undemocratic [sic] thing. I don't feel I can say what we'd do in a Warren-Stevenson race, for example, except to call "Thank goodness there was such a wonderful choice [sic] of candidates."

Lesson for Americans

It has often been argued that a Socialist has an untenable case against Communism; and we have a great deal of sympathy for that position. Life, however, plays the craziest jokes on philosophy, and we have not heard anything sillier in months than this report from Austria: Austria's (Catholic) People's Party is anxious to obtain a loan from the Soviet Government, while Austria's Socialists reject the loan project as "part of a scheme by the People's Party to collaborate with the Communists."

The sad truth of the matter is indeed that Austria's political Catholicism, though grounded in philosophy and even steeped in theology, has, in the tactical sense, been far less reliably anti-Communist than Austria's socialism (which, in program and jargon, is very likely the most Marxian of all European Socialist parties). Austria's People's Party, to be sure, does not flirt with Communism "ideologically," and its leaders, we can safely assume, would rather die at the stake than surrender spiritually to the Communist heresy. The Austrian Socialists, on the other hand, cannot start a conversation or an editorial without an obeisance or two to the gods of the Marxian faith. But the Austrian Socialists learned all there is to know about Communist tactics and Communist resourcefulness in day-by-day battles in the unions, for years and years; while the leaders of the People's Party, myopic as only ideologues can be, readily and innocently step into Communist traps. Somewhere, it seems to us, there is a lesson here for Americans.

The Liberal Line...

WILLMOORE KENDALL

The Liberal line on the current (84th) Congress, as laid down in the "Congressional Supplement" of the *ADA World*, is as follows:

— The "same old conservative coalition" that has dominated all Congresses but one since 1940 has dominated the present Congress. And that coalition includes all the Republicans plus one-third or more of the Democrats.

— The few Republicans who in the past have done battle on the Liberal side of political issues "have submerged themselves in what . . . Senator . . . Case describes as . . . 1000 per cent support of Eisenhower." Result: ". . . nearly a 1000 per cent repudiation of liberal practices and principles, as any fair reading of Eisenhower's domestic program . . . clearly demonstrates."

— The Congress Liberals have had to choose between a) doing battle issue by issue, so as to build a record on which to wage a campaign for the election of more Liberals, and b) compromising "here and there," so as to be able to put together an occasional "winning combination on specific issues." They have in fact chosen b), but all too often the compromising has been a "one-way street, with the conservatives directing the traffic."

— Liberal interests in foreign affairs have been faring badly in Congress. Concretely: Congress trimmed the Administration's already "weak and puny foreign aid program"; instead of forcing through a reciprocal trade bill permitting substantial tariff reduction and discouraging tariff increases, it passed a bill that accomplished the opposite results; and it failed to resist a "strong effort" to make opposition to the Formosa resolution a "pro-Communist crime against freedom" (i.e., it passed the resolution, although everyone knows the President didn't really need it).

— Liberal interests in the field of domestic policy have also fared badly. Concretely: an attempt to give "badly needed tax relief" to low-income, large-family taxpayers failed when two strategically situated Democrats

— Democrats, mind you — joined the President in opposing it; Congress approved the Eisenhower plan to sell the government-owned synthetic rubber plants to the nation's biggest oil and rubber companies (nor was a voice raised in favor of the government's keeping the plants itself!); and it failed to vote statehood for Hawaii and Alaska (which the Administration opposed because these measures might increase Democratic representation in Congress).

— Even where Liberal interests in domestic policy appeared to fare well, a second look shows that too little was done too late. Concretely: minimum wages indeed went up from 75 cents to a dollar, but they almost went up only to 90 cents, and anyhow the attempt to extend the minimum wage to millions of unprotected low-wage workers failed hands-down; and while the "best housing bill . . . since 1952" did go through, still it calls for only 45,000 public low-rent housing units during the next year.

You can see for yourself: ADA has a case. It doesn't necessarily add up to Congress' being "dominated" by a "conservative coalition" or to 1000 per cent repudiation of Liberal principles and practices. But with foreign aid being held to a stingy four billion a year, with minimum wages up only to a buck an hour, with only 45,000 public housing units being built a year, and these to be rented not given away, with the poor still paying income-taxes, with government-owned synthetic rubber plants being sold and not operated by the government as in Russia, and with the Administration and its friends in Congress not breaking their necks to increase Democratic Party representation in Senate and House—with all this happening, it *does* look as if ADA weren't getting its way about everything. One can therefore readily understand the note of wonderment and exasperation that pervades the "Congressional Supplement." All's right with the world only when Congress is dominated by a Liberal coalition: if Congress isn't dominated by such a

coalition, then the world isn't behaving as it should behave. And something's got to be done about it.

What? Well, what you do about it depends on how you square off to what this columnist, in his playfully Olympian way, likes to call the political question of the age, namely: Did the 1952 Presidential election happen, or didn't it? If it did happen, if the American people by overwhelming majority vote did repudiate "Liberal principles and practices" (this being Liberal longhand for a levelling program), then the curious behavior of the 84th Congress merely reflects the current wishes of the Congressmen's constituents; and ADA's task—that of changing those constituents' minds about levelling—is all cut out for it. If, on the other hand, the 1952 election did not happen, and the voters do currently want a levelling program, ADA has only to show them, between now and the next election, that their Congressmen are betraying them.

And this brings us to the first piece of good news—let it not be understood to create a precedent—that has ever found its way into this department. Namely this: the official view in the upper reaches of ADA's far-flung organization is that the 1952 election did *not* happen. The rest of the Supplement, accordingly, is devoted to analysis of the individual voting records of the Congressmen (on issues involving Liberal principles and practices, of course), so that no one will be left in doubt as to who the traitors to the will of the people are, or as to the scale on which each of them has betrayed. Each Representative and each Senator gets tested on each of ten issues, with a plus sign going down after his name for each issue on which he voted as ADA thinks he should have, and a minus sign for each issue on which he did not vote as ADA thinks he should have.

My first reaction to all this was that ADA's views on how Congressmen ought to vote aren't all that important. But I've decided, on mature deliberation, that they're a not altogether unreliable touchstone—upside-down of course—for deciding whom to oppose and whom to support for Congress in the next election. So the research staff of *ADA World* is hereby retained as an (unpaid) aid and comfort to NATIONAL REVIEW.

Can Moscow Deliver?

An expert acquainted with all the data challenges officially accepted estimates of Soviet economic potential and its ability to provide foreign aid

PYRRHO

In the current phase of the cold war cycle, the main Soviet diplomatic gambit is to provoke the U. S. into extraordinary measures by offers of Russian trade and military and economic assistance. This "ploy" seems to be working well in the Near East, where we are offering our help on the Aswan and Jordan projects in return for an easing of Israeli-Arab tension and such other concessions as we can negotiate.

The awkward aspect of these projects is that it is unlikely that they can be carried out on an expedited basis without inflation. Certainly the Aswan project, on the ten-year completion basis of Egyptians want, cannot fail to produce inflation. This would suit the Kremlin very well—it has never forgotten Preobrazhenski's characterization of inflation as "the machine gun that attacked the bourgeois regime in the rear." The role of inflation in the capture of China is still fresh in their minds, not to mention North Vietnam. India lies ahead—the apple of the Soviet eye.

The new Indian five-year plan aims at an annual rate of capital formation of about \$2.7 billion of which some \$300 million would be in foreign aid. A rate of domestic capital formation of \$2.4 billion a year, especially when concentrated in the heavy industry sector rather than in agriculture and light industry, may be more than twice the level of which India is capable.

The Indian five-year plan is based on the Soviet model and was announced just before the arrival of Bulganin and Khrushchev, presumably on the assumption that this sincere flattery would be pleasing to the eminent visitors. No doubt it was. India is a poor country with a national product of no more than \$20 billion, hardly greater than that of Italy. It plans an investment program that will endanger its present relative stability. The Russians will applaud.

They have also offered to help. Sometime since, they promised to build a steel mill and in recent discussions in New Delhi they made additional promises. The spectacle of high Soviet officials carrying on economic discussions in underdeveloped countries has now become a commonplace. In Rangoon, Cairo, New Delhi and Kabul the Soviets are making promises. Promises and the arms trade are the principal Russian currency in this phase of the cold war.

In the U. S. these Russian offers have created an extraordinary flurry of activity in the press. One popular argument is that if we don't get into a "bold new program" right away the Russians will get there before us. The Kremlin, it is argued, will not pass up the chance to help an underdeveloped nation rise in the economic world. The U. S. must act, therefore, and act quickly. We must frame an aid program of double the current level or the Kremlin will seize the opportunity and move in ahead of us. One hundred billion—\$5 billion a year for 20 years—in foreign economic aid has been suggested by Mr. Jacob Javits.

Mr. Dulles Lends His Cachet

The "bold new program" rests largely on the assumption that the USSR is, in fact, now capable of providing foreign aid and trade in a massive amount, and, by reason of its rapidly expanding output, will be able to sustain increasing levels throughout the Soviet bloc and the neutral area.

The proponents of massive increases in the U. S. foreign aid program assume that the gross national product of the USSR is now running at an annual rate of \$135 billion. This estimate has the merit of being officially approved by all U. S. government agencies. It is also fully supported by Soviet statistics which, indeed, often make even more extraordinary claims.

Secretary Dulles, in his American

Legion speech of October 10, 1955, put his cachet on the estimate by saying the U. S. product, now at nearly \$400 billion, is "three times that of the Soviet Union with its much larger population." Mr. Dulles is not a statistician, and we cannot, accordingly, regard this as his considered judgment. The estimate in the speech was made by statisticians. On reflection, Mr. Dulles might consider a revision of his estimate. Some of the materials upon which such a revision might proceed will be recited here.

At the outset, the implications of this estimate need examination. If Russian GNP is currently \$135 billion, it has grown at a rate of about 8 per cent annually over the last 25 years. This means that the Russians have been able to increase their national output from a level of about \$20 billion (a generous estimate) in 1930 to nearly seven times that level in 1955. The increase has continued each year—through the collectivization period, through the war conversion period of 1937-40, throughout the war and into the postwar decade.

In 1985, if the rate officially assumed to prevail through war and terror over the last 25 years continues, the USSR will be producing at an annual rate of \$1,000 billion, or more than two-and-a-half times the present U. S. level. Each year, Russia will enjoy a rate of increase in national product equal or nearly equal to the unprecedented rate of growth in U. S. product over the past year.

One of the principal difficulties in accepting the GNP estimate of \$135 billion for the USSR is that there have been long periods during the last 25 years when even the Russians admit that there was little growth in economic output. It was not until 1948 that the prewar (1940) levels of production were reached, a period of eight years during which no economic growth occurred and in which tremendous losses were sustained.

In the three-year period 1937-40, a close inquiry suggests that there was no net increase in industrial output in the USSR. The *ruble* value of industrial output rose almost 50 per cent during the period, but this rise was due almost wholly to inflation, primarily in the machinery industry. It was a period of wholesale conversion to war production when wage increases were used to direct labor into war industries. The *ruble* value of machinery output rose by some 30 billion rubles while wage outlays in that sector rose by 32 billion rubles. The increases in wage outlay were then skimmed off by the turnover tax, the annual yield of which rose 30 billion rubles, enough to cancel out the wage increase made in the machinery sector.

On this view, it would appear that for the entire period 1937-48 there was little or no growth in total Soviet output. If this is true, and Soviet statistics suggest that it is, then an increase from a GNP of \$20 billion to \$135 billion would have had to take place over a period of only 14 years. At this point even the credulity of U. S. government statisticians might well be strained.

Nevertheless, official acceptance of the \$135 billion estimate continues, perhaps indicating a stubborn belief among U. S. government statisticians that Russian methods of economic management are conspicuously more effective than those prevailing in the West, and, unlike our own, are able to secure an invariant annual increase in product regardless of war, terror, massive conversion and famine.

However, we must regard as unsettled the question whether the current U. S. official estimate of Soviet national product rests simply on a credulous belief in the validity of Russian statistics or an awesome regard for the efficiency of Russian economic policy. We also have to dismiss the notion that the estimate is designed to frighten Congress and the American people, if only for the reason that it has been the fashion for many years to credit the Soviet Union with fantastic increases in national product.

There has been little change in the nature of official estimates of Soviet economic achievements for two decades. Despite the enormous growth in the government statistical establishment and the proliferation of intelligence agencies devoted to gathering

Russian economic information,¹ the estimates of Russian economic power remain in conventional channels. Russian data are regarded with awe, and U. S. official estimates faithfully reflect the extraordinary claims that are implicit in Soviet economic statistics.

If U. S. official estimates of Russian GNP are credible only to government statisticians and the Russian experts of the U. S. intelligence agencies, what shall the rest of us believe? To what authority can we turn for a finding on the critical question of how strong Russia is. If none of us has any real knowledge about the Russian economic machine other than bits and pieces, how are we to obtain an estimate that will be believable to reasonable people? And how are we to make an estimate of the efficiency of investment in the Russian bloc?

No Gain in Agriculture

Let us turn first to Soviet agriculture. We know more about that because changes in output occur more slowly. It is an activity that engages about 55 per cent of the working population. It is a field in which enormous investment in plant and equipment has been made. The agricultural machine tractor stations and the maintenance and repair stations employ nearly 2,000,000 people. Many agricultural operations, according to Soviet propaganda, have been almost wholly mechanized.

And yet, it would appear that in 1954 Soviet agriculture produced little if any more than it did in 1925, despite a rural population that is 10,000,000 or more larger. Thus Soviet agricul-

ture would appear to be a case of Graham Hutton's First Law of Thermo-uneconomics, or Alice's Law, in which the more capital is invested, the less is produced. British Coal Board operations are the distinguished example of this law in the West (coal output in this socialized industry is an inverse function of capital investment).

While reliable statistics for Soviet agriculture are not available, it is probable that for 1954 the value of the entire vegetable product of the USSR was well below \$5 billion, and total agricultural output was not significantly greater than \$6 billion. This would place the output of Soviet agriculture at roughly 60 per cent of the U. S. level. In practical terms, 2,000,000 efficient U. S. farm families are producing considerably more than a Soviet agricultural population fifteen times greater.

In agriculture, at least, Soviet policies cannot be said to have been notably successful. After 25 years or more of revolutionary change in farm organization, the investment of billions in machinery and equipment, the allocation of hundreds of thousands of trained scientists, technicians, and engineers for the purpose of establishing scientific methods of cultivation, and a 10 per cent growth in the agricultural population, Russian agriculture is still not producing as effectively as it did in the period before collectivization.

The new and vaunted Khrushchev corn program that envisages the opening of some 75 million acres of new land would appear to be a special case of Alice's Law. Farmers and farm equipment and hundreds of thousands of urban "volunteers," bureaucrats and labor troops are being moved to the semi-arid lands of Central Asia where corn is going to be raised with as little as nine inches of annual rainfall. This program will be a statistical success, but there is some doubt among agricultural experts whether much corn will be grown in the new areas. It would also seem that the transfer of farmers and farm equipment from other regions might result in losses in agricultural output in those areas.

If Russian output of food and fiber is little if any greater than in 1925, the Russian people can hardly be eating or dressing as well as they did in 1925. This inference is clinched by popula-

¹The growth and proliferation of U.S. intelligence agencies may be an exception to Parkinson's Law (first enunciated in the "Economist" of November 19, 1955) which predicates an annual rate of growth in the Civil Service establishment of 5.17 per cent to 6.56 per cent. This newly formulated scientific law contains two factors: Factor I, the Law on the Multiplication of Subordinates, and Factor II, the Law on the Multiplication of Work. It is a law that derives from the commonplace observation that work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion. This scientific discovery, as the distinguished authority on the Law observes, is "inapplicable except in theory to the politics of the day. It is not the business of the botanist to eradicate the weeds. Enough for him if he can tell us just how fast they grow." However, in the interest of scientific advance, we have thought it appropriate to note that the intelligence agencies of the U.S. government may very well be an exception to Parkinson's Law in that the average annual growth rate over a decade may be much greater than the scientifically determined maximum of 6.56 per cent.

tion increases, meanwhile, of about 40 per cent, or more than 60 million. The continuing, though modest, Soviet imports of rice, wheat, and cotton would also suggest that consumption levels have fallen dangerously and may not even have returned to the low, immediate prewar standards.

Among the agricultural population it is generally agreed that circumstances are worse than in 1925—consumption is well below \$100 per capita. The peasant diet, on a per capita basis at current prices, probably does not exceed a value of \$60 a year, and reaches that average only because consumption by Party members and officials is relatively high.

Among the 10 to 15 million slave laborers consumption is surely as low as it is among the peasant population. It is accordingly reasonable to assume an average per capita consumption for 140 to 145 million Russians at or below \$100 a year and a total consumption for this part of the population of about \$14.5 billion.

Consumption among the urban population is, of course, higher. It may rise to as much as three or three-and-one-half times the average level prevailing among the peasantry, in considerable part because of the greater cost of transport and distribution of food to urban areas. For the 65 or 70 million Soviet citizens properly counted as urban, total consumption may, therefore, rise to a total of \$20 to \$25 billion.

On these estimates, total personal consumption in the USSR may be as much as \$35 to \$40 billion or somewhat lower than consumption outlay in the U. S. at the depth of the depression. Such a comparison, however, is distorting because in the U. S. in 1933 only slightly more than a quarter of total personal consumption expenditure went for food while in the USSR a disproportionately high share of personal expenditure—perhaps 60 per cent—is for food while a very small part of expenditure is for rent, household operations, and other factors.

Wretched Housing

On the whole, personal consumption in the USSR can be more or less directly inferred from the state of agriculture and the condition of housing, transport, and distribution—crowding and queueing are, of course, universal in the USSR. The composition of the

diet is clearly implied as well as the consumption of fiber in the form of clothing and soft goods. These inferences are confirmed by daily observation of consumption standards in the Soviet Union.

The average family of four or five, with at least two wage earners, living in one room, sharing household facilities with several other families and condemned to a monotonous diet primarily composed of bread and potatoes, is not an exception but the rule. These are the data that are known; they should form the basis of any estimate of the national product of the USSR.

It may be, after detailed consideration of Soviet consumption patterns, that the value of food in the personal consumption component of national product would approach the suggested upper limit of \$25 billion. However, given the necessary composition of the diet, the fact that processing and distribution are at a very crude level and the rule that two wage earners are needed in every family if minimum consumption standards are to be met, it is unlikely that consumption approaches the limit suggested.

U. S. consumer outlay for food in 1941 was \$18 billion, and it is doubtful whether the Soviet people will approach that standard in this generation. The suggested estimate shows a range, on a per capita basis for the entire Soviet population, of \$90 to \$115, which would appear to be a very liberal accounting.

This picture of Soviet consumption is in sharp contrast to the picture that is suggested by the U. S. official estimates of Soviet product. According to official estimates, personal consumption in the USSR approaches \$70 billion, an amount that is higher than total personal consumption in the U. S. in 1937. Through these rose-colored estimates of Soviet wealth, the well-being of the average Soviet citizen cannot be doubted—he is 75 per cent as well fed, well housed, and well clothed and served as the average U. S. citizen in 1937.

None of the harsh realities that are continually being observed and reported from the USSR emerges from the rosy statistical picture that a personal consumption estimate of \$70 billion indicates. Instead, the U. S. government statistics suggest a Soviet nation whose population spends \$5

billion on automobiles, \$3.5 billion on recreation, \$8 billion on housing, \$9 billion on household operations and \$9 billion on clothing. Without rose-colored glasses, one has to strain to see this picture.

The estimate for personal consumption that is suggested as more appropriate to the conditions known to prevail is a range of \$35 to \$40 billion. And this may be much too high. Personal consumption may more nearly approach \$30 billion. Such a figure at least has the merit of conforming to what is known of the plight of the Soviet citizen.

An Embarrassing Remainder

In the U. S. official estimates, personal consumption is presumably a residual that is arrived at after deducting estimated government expenditure and investment from the estimate of national product that is arrived at by compounding 1930 Soviet product at an annual rate of 8 per cent over a period of 25 years. Or at least this is the easiest way of arriving at the established official figure for Soviet GNP.

In practice, it may be that statistical grubbing in Soviet publications accounts for the current U. S. official estimates. But however it is arrived at, an embarrassing remainder in the form of a consumption residual is left behind. It is the picture of a rich and contented Russian population, luxuriating in levels approaching American private expenditure that prevailed in 1937.

In part, this official conclusion as to consumption cannot be avoided because it is necessary to assume that personal consumption must represent more than 50 per cent of gross national product. It does, however, create something of a dilemma for the statisticians. Out of the remainder of national product available for other purposes, it is necessary to find the funds that are needed to sustain the rate of growth that has become so much an article of the U. S. government statisticians' faith.

At least 10 per cent of national product is needed simply to keep the present plant operating. And it may well be more because of the dismal state of repair into which Soviet plant and equipment have been allowed to fall. In the past, as Welles Hangen

reported in a dispatch to the *New York Times* of October 18, 1955, deterioration and obsolescence have been disregarded by Soviet statisticians, who are accustomed to calculate output on the basis of the most modern installations. These liabilities cannot now be deferred, and an increasing amount of national product will be required just to keep things going.

In addition, U. S. official statisticians have to allocate at least 25 per cent of their estimate of Soviet product to capital formation if the assumed rate of 8 per cent growth is to be maintained as official dogma. The dilemma that arises is, with personal consumption at 55 per cent of GNP, repair and maintenance requirements at from 10 to 15 per cent, and investment at a minimum of 25 per cent, how to find a remainder that is large enough adequately to represent government outlay, especially military expenditure.

The dilemma, however, must have been resolved because we have Mr. Dulles' statement to show that the romantic view of Soviet statistics has triumphed. Russian economic product will continue to rise officially, as it always has in the past, at a uniform rate, and the future well-being of the Soviet population is statistically assured. In 1985 GNP will be \$1,000 billion and personal consumption will amount to \$550 billion, or higher than current U. S. levels.

One of the difficulties with this aspect of the official estimates is that the present leadership in the USSR is concentrating on expansion of heavy industry and, with the exception of a few months during the Malenkov-Beria regime, has tried to do so for 25 years, during which consumption levels for the urban population have increased slightly, if at all, and standards of consumption among the Russian peasantry have fallen.

This brief review of the personal-consumption factor in estimates of Soviet national product, when taken in conjunction with what is known about the standards of consumption that prevail in the Soviet Union, should suggest that \$40 billion is a generous estimate for personal consumption and that, in all probability, gross national product is not higher than \$75 billion and may be nearer \$60 billion.

If this is a reasonable estimate of Russian GNP, then it would appear

that Soviet economic product, at a maximum, is more nearly 18 to 20 per cent of U. S. product than the 33 per cent quoted by Mr. Dulles. In fact, Russian product may be no more than 14 or 15 per cent of the U. S. level, or roughly the U. S. level at the end of World War One.

Can Growth Be Maintained?

On this accounting, Soviet economic growth has proceeded at an average rate of more than 4 per cent over the last 25 years which, to give the devil his due, is a not inconsiderable achievement. This means that the Kremlin has directed at least 15 per cent of GNP into investment, and, after consideration of war losses and the accelerated rate of capital consumption during the war, it may be that in many years more than 20 per cent has been directed into investment. To accomplish this and at the same time to maintain a military establishment that now requires an annual outlay of at least \$10 to \$15 billion suggests that an extraordinary effort has been made.

Whether this rate of growth can be maintained is another question. As we have seen, the grave agricultural crisis has required the diversion of tremendous resources into agriculture. And it is not enough merely to invest in agriculture in the USSR: as we have noted, this is a sector in which the First Law of Thermo-uneconomics applies—the more capital the less product. It has become necessary not only to invest capital resources in agriculture, but the Kremlin will also at this point have to provide some consumer goods for the peasant population. This will mean an additional diversion of resources from use in the expansion of heavy industry. The prospect, accordingly, is that agriculture will draw off an increasing share of national product both in the form of capital and consumption goods if it is to continue to feed the rapidly increasing Soviet population.

In the cities a similar difficulty is developing, particularly in housing. Occupancy levels have reached a maximum density of one family to one room. Under-maintenance of housing during the war and postwar years has resulted in grave deterioration. Extensive repairs are essential and current maintenance costs higher. In

future, it is likely that construction will pace urban growth because the urban population can only increase as fast as new housing becomes available. Economic growth, therefore, is contingent on a considerable increase in housing construction outlay.

Industry is faced with a similar problem. Under-maintenance, during the war and postwar years, and obsolescence have now reached a point at which action can no longer be deferred. Official Soviet publications report that this problem has now become so severe that, over the life of an average piece of equipment, expenditures for maintenance and repair amount to from five to six times the original capital cost. The depreciation chickens have come home to roost.

The simple fact is that the Russians are overdrawn on all economic accounts. They are in deficit in food, housing, manpower and fuel. It is more than likely that they can no longer bear the levels of military outlay needed to maintain their great military establishment on a modern basis. They have cut military expenditure; they have transferred troops back into agriculture; and they have scrounged around the world for higher trade levels which, after they are agreed on, are not met.

This is the background of the Geneva spirit. They have beggared themselves by mismanagement. They possess military might, but the rapidly increasing cost of new and more complex weapons is gradually becoming an intolerable burden. They are deeply troubled internally. They have reached a temporary limit of growth. Shortages in every economic sector are critical. They must have a respite, particularly from the terrible burden of new, complex, costly armaments.

This depressing picture of the Soviet economy as a whole should not be allowed to cloud recognition of their brilliant scientific achievements. They have produced great scientists and their scientists will presumably continue to make advances along the entire technological front. The exact extent of their achievements in the atomic field, in weapon development, and in the design of production equipment is hard to estimate, but is in any case considerable and probably equal to our own.

Yet these facts should not be taken to mean that the Soviet economy is

capable of quantity production of the new equipment. This requires a capacity that the USSR is far from attaining. Their resources are limited and, given the continuing wasteful use of resources, it is unlikely that they are capable of major production advances except in limited sectors. They are, after all, a relatively poor nation economically, and far from being able to provide important economic assistance to other nations. They are, rather, in desperate need themselves.

Yet despite the economic picture that lies behind the Geneva smile, official U. S. Government estimates continue to portray the USSR as a rapidly expanding economy of a third the power of the U. S. It is an economy, on U. S. Government assumptions, that is currently producing at a rate of \$135 billion a year and expanding at a rate of at least 7 per cent. It is this assumption that has created

doubt here at home. It is feared that the USSR will provide technical and capital assistance in massive amounts to the underdeveloped countries. It is time to escape this statistical incubus. Arms they can provide, but the Russians are quite painfully poor in an economic sense.

The moral to this story would seem to be that physical measurements should not be made through a magnifying glass. The examination of statistics under a microscope, particularly Soviet statistics, can lead to remarkable delusions—such as the U. S. official delusion that Soviet GNP is \$135 billion. Through bureaucratic magnification the Soviet bear may look like a full-grown economic grizzly, but looked at calmly, steadily and whole it is only a hungry and vicious cub. The Kremlin cannot carry through a foreign aid program of serious proportions.

The Resistance

(The information in this column, transmitted by a special correspondent, comes from first-hand sources.)

Who Repatriates Whom?

Displaced persons from eastern Europe who are living in West Germany have reason for alarm at new moves in connection with repatriation problems. Herr von Brentano, West German Minister of Foreign Affairs, has stated that his government will not prevent Soviet citizens who wish to do so from returning to the Soviet Union. His statement was in reply to an article in Moscow's *Izvestia* which further hinted that full repatriation of the German prisoners from the Soviet Union could be expected only if West Germany "released" 100,000 "Soviet citizens." (Moscow includes DP refugees from East Poland, Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania in its definition of "Soviet citizens.")

Herr von Brentano further declared: "We will be pleased to let the Soviet authorities see for themselves that no Soviet citizen wishing to return is prevented from doing so."

The refugees fear that these words may imply an invitation for Soviet "missions" to enter Germany, as after

the war, and to apply pressures. The West German government is in a difficult position. Moscow has released fewer than 6,000 of the 10,000 German prisoners whose freedom was promised to Chancellor Adenauer, and seems to be conditioning the return of the rest upon a "solution" of its DP demands. Realizing Bonn's dilemma, refugee organizations plan to appeal to the Western powers to aid emigration of those DP's whose security is thus threatened in West Germany.

Neck Insurance

The Communist successors of the Nazi rulers of East Germany show that they have carefully studied one lesson of denazification, the Nuremberg Trials and the war criminal executions. In a number of localities, Communist officials are granting ordinary citizens certain privileges and facilities in exchange for written "certificates of good conduct" affirming that these officials are behaving in a humane and decent manner. By preference the certificates are sought from peasants or clergymen.

This practice is an analogue of a Nazi method during the German occupation in Europe. Nazi occupation officials tried to insure their future, in the event of German defeat, by getting similar good conduct certificates,

often by means of bribery and blackmail, from prominent citizens of the occupied countries.

The East German Communists seem remarkably pessimistic. The Nazi insurance scheme was not started until 1944, the last year of Nazidom.

The Atom in East Germany

Moscow recently gave permission for atomic research in East Germany, as an immediate result of which the higher education budget for 1955-56 has been revised. Funds originally allocated to the Universities of Berlin, Halle, Leipzig and Freiberg were transferred to a Central Research Plant. Soviet professors, who will be made available by the Leningrad University Institute of Nuclear Research, are supposed to head this Central Research Plant, and a staff of assistants will be recruited from graduates who have studied physics at Leningrad.

The nuclear specialists, Professors Manfred von Ardenne, Werner Hirsch, and Heinrich, who have been working in the Soviet Union from 1945 until the present, recently returned to Dresden, where they were assigned rooms at the "Weisser Hirsch." Professor von Ardenne was accompanied by his staff of assistants, and was given a house containing a fourteen-room laboratory.

The Dresden Town Council gave a reception in honor of the professors' return. The entire faculty of the Dresden Technical University was invited, but it is reported that half failed to attend. Professor von Ardenne declared at the reception that he had worked for German armament prior to 1945 and had continued to do so while in the Soviet Union.

Von Ardenne's laboratory is closed to everyone except himself and his Soviet-imported assistants. It is generally believed that the three returned scientists are Soviet citizens, and that the Central Research Plan will be affiliated with the Leningrad Institute.

In the scientific circles of Halle, Leipzig and Freiberg universities, even among party members, there are strong feelings of opposition and resentment at these developments. They are thought to mark the beginning of the total "integration" of East German technical universities into Soviet organization and plans.

NATIONAL TRENDS

L. BRENT BOZELL

New Year's Eve stirs memories of the past. This correspondent, resisting the tall stiff one, reaches for his scrapbook and turns back to notes he made a week or so after the inauguration of Dwight D. Eisenhower:

"It is clear that the new Eisenhower Administration means to anchor its foreign policy to a firm moral foundation: it intends to encourage liberation operations against the Communist empire. When the new President said, two days ago, in his State of the Union message, that there is not 'any logic or sense in a condition that required the United States Navy to assume defensive responsibilities on behalf of the Chinese Communists,' he gave the go ahead signal to Chiang Kai-shek for offensive operations against the mainland.

"The President's statement is in keeping with the promises in the 1952 Republican platform to repudiate 'the futile, negative and immoral policy of containment'; to 'make liberty into a beacon light of hope'; to 'repudiate all commitments contained in secret understandings, such as . . . Yalta, which aid Communist enslavements'; to make it 'clear, on the highest authority of the President and the Congress' that the U. S. seeks the 'genuine independence of those captive people.'

"The new Administration's policy was adumbrated by General Eisenhower on August 25, 1952: ' . . . let America, saddened by the tragedy of lost opportunity, etch in its memory the roll of countries once independent now suffocating under this Russian pall . . . All these people are blood kin to us . . . Dare we rest while these millions of our kinsmen remain in slavery? I can almost hear your answer.'

"U. S. policy will henceforth reflect the basic moral principle set forth in the State of the Union message: 'We shall never acquiesce in the enslavement of any people in order to purchase fancied gain for ourselves.'"

After that, this correspondent recalls, he sat back and watched events unfold.

—July 1953: The Administration agrees to an armistice in Korea, and thus relinquishes an opportunity to liberate North Korea. This decision is made although the Korean military commanders "believed that victory in Korea was possible and desirable . . . [and] that political considerations were permitted to overrule military necessity." (Report of Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, January 21, 1955.)

—April 1954: President Eisenhower proposes a *modus vivendi* in Indo-China, and the U. S. thereupon acquiesces in a deal with the Viet Minh and Red China whereby twelve million human beings and half the country are handed over to the Communists.

—August 1954: Administration spokesmen begin to describe U. S. policy as one of "peaceful coexistence," borrowing a term originally attributed to Lenin.

—January 1955: The Administration directs Free China to abandon its advance base on the Tachen Islands; Chiang is assured that if he complies, the U. S. will help defend Quemoy and the Matsus.

—March 1955: The Yalta papers are released, but the Administration bars repudiation of the "enslavements." President Eisenhower observes that "There is nothing to be gained by going back ten years and showing that in the light of after events, someone may have been right, and someone may have been wrong."

—March 1955: The President, when asked if the U. S. intends to support Free China's liberation aims, announces: "The United States is not going to be a party to an aggressive war."

—May 1955: Secretary Dulles reveals that the U. S. will help defend Quemoy and the Matsus only if they are attacked as part of a full-scale assault on Formosa—an unlikely Communist strategy.

—May 1955: The U. S. signs the Austrian State Treaty which commits

Austria to bind her economy to Russia's, to permit Communist political activity in Austria, and to refrain from participating in the defense arrangements of the Western democracies.

—June 1955: The President observes that the Austrian Treaty is evidence that Soviet peace talk may be "sincere," and decides to meet with the Kremlin leaders "at the summit" to find out for sure.

—June 1955: The Senate, under heavy Administration pressure, rejects the McCarthy resolution which recommends obtaining a prior Soviet commitment to discuss Communist satellites at the summit meeting. McCarthy argues that the Communist slave empire is the cause of world tensions; but the Senate resists "tying the President's hands."

—July 1955: In his opening address at the Geneva conference, the President alludes to the satellites, but drops the subject when Bulganin denies the existence of a "problem." The President discovers, however, that the Soviet Union sincerely wants peace, and concludes that the Geneva meeting was a "success."

—July 1955: Secretary Dulles reveals that the U. S. will view any attempts by South Korea and South Vietnam to free the northern halves of their countries as "aggression," and will oppose them.

—October 1955: The U. S. offers to guarantee the boundaries of the Communist empire.

—November 1955: President Eisenhower conveys to the Soviet Union "the best wishes of the people of the United States" on the anniversary of the day the Communists took over Russia.

—December 1955: The U. S. promotes the "package deal" for admission of Communist satellites to the UN, thus acquiesces in the UN's ratification of Communist rule in eastern Europe. In this connection, President Eisenhower sends three personal cables to Chiang Kai-shek, urging the Chinese Nationalist government not to veto the admission of a Soviet creature called "Outer Mongolia."

This correspondent closes the scrapbook and reaches for the tall stiff one.

Witch-Hunting with the Left

At last a congressional investigating committee has the enthusiastic support of the Left—even the *Daily Worker*. It is attacking Federal security procedures

FRANCIS J. McNAMARA

Senator Thomas C. Hennings, who as the head of a Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights has been tracking down abuses in the Federal security system for three and a half months, has discovered what most people have known for a long time. He has discovered that prominent Liberals look on Communist espionage and subversion as of no great importance, and that persons with Communist-front records have frequently been vexed by security procedures, and would like the security system done away with.

The Subcommittee has been served by a large, able, fast-moving staff, with a professional sense of press-agentry. For the Subcommittee's opening hearing back in September, it snagged no less an auditorium than the old Supreme Court chamber in the Capitol—hallowed ground, where the first great constitutional safeguards to liberty were hammered out in the early years of the Republic. The chamber had not been used for such purposes before, but no one in authority, on the spur of the moment, could think up a reason for refusing it to Senator Hennings.

An additional flourish was to seat the witnesses in the chairs once used by the Justices of the Supreme Court, where they formed a solemn semi-circle high above the spectators. Mr. Hennings and his colleagues crouched in the space below designed for the Court's clerks. In these awesome surroundings, the churches of America purportedly spoke through the voice of Dr. Eugene Carson Blake of the National Council of Churches, who found the Federal security system inimical to our freedoms, and felt a "grave" concern over congressional investigating committees. The women of America expressed similar apprehensions through Mrs. John G. Lee of the League of Women Voters, and the press through Editor J. Russel Wiggins of the *Washington Post*. Spokes-

men for organizations defending the security system—the American Bar Association, the American Legion and the Knights of Columbus—were drowned in billows of oratory.

Favored Witnesses

In subsequent, more orthodox hearings, opponents of the security system continued to dominate its defenders, both in their numbers and the help they received from the Subcommittee's counsel and staff. A witness with whom the Subcommittee evidenced conspicuous solidarity was Dr. Linus Pauling of the California Institute of Technology, a 1954 Nobel prize winner. Dr. Pauling's Communist-front associations are well-known and formidable. They occupied two pages of a report by the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1951.

The Subcommittee received Dr. Pauling with deference, and questioned him about being denied a passport by the State Department in 1952, a denial that was called a "harassment." Dr. Pauling said he "could not believe it," by which he meant the State Department's crude stupidity and wrongheadedness. Neither Senator Hennings nor the Subcommittee counsel bothered to ask him about his admission at the time that, of twenty-four State Department specifications, "some . . . are true and some . . . are not true."

Another witness of similarly well-known leanings was Harvard's Zechariah Chafee, Jr., who testified on the Smith Act. He said he had gone through every word on the trial record of the eleven top Communist leaders. "I couldn't see a word there that would make anybody lose five minutes of sleep. They [the Communists] were just talking nonsense."

As an expert, the Subcommittee called Dr. Alexander Meiklejohn of the Experimental College at the Uni-

versity of Wisconsin. He told of his researches into what the First Amendment had meant in the minds of the Founding Fathers. These had convinced him that the question, "Are you a Communist?", when asked by a congressional committee, was an "intolerable invasion" of individual rights.

In marked contrast, defenders of security measures got the back of the Subcommittee's hand. Some of them were:

Smythe Gambrell, president of the American Bar Association, who had to defend the ABA's denial of membership to lawyers who were Communists, and its recent decision to ask prospective members about Communist affiliations. When Mr. Gambrell defended the ABA's recommendation that lawyers invoking the Fifth Amendment before congressional committees should be disbarred, he was asked if the ABA "believes in the Bill of Rights."

David W. Peck, the presiding justice of the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, was put under lengthy cross-examination about the New York practice of asking jurors whether they are Communists.

Philip Young, chairman of the Civil Service Commission, was accused of manipulating security statistics, and forcefully demanded, and obtained, an apology.

Jerome D. Fenton, director of the Defense Department's Office of Industrial Personnel Security, was also a target of sharp, often bitter, questions.

A clue to the Subcommittee's self-chosen course lies in its counsel and staff. Its chief hearings-counsel was until recently Lon Hocker, a former head of the St. Louis Bar Association and one of his city's most vocal Liberals. He is now back home as head of the Missouri Insurance Company.

During the early weeks of the Sub-

committee's life, its chief counsel, and Hocker's nominal superior, was Marshall MacDuffie. In 1946, as an UNRRA official in the Ukraine, MacDuffie formed a friendship with Khrushchev, the present Kremlin boss. His best-selling book, *The Red Carpet*, tells of trips to Moscow in 1953 and again early this year, and praises Khrushchev fulsomely. He is a member of the left-wing National Committee for An Effective Congress. Soon after the Subcommittee began open hearings, Hocker and MacDuffie quarreled for reasons that are still unclear, but apparently turned on the way the hearings were to be conducted, and MacDuffie withdrew in Hocker's favor.

An "Obsession about Informers"

Hocker's research director, Benjamin Ginsburg, is described by acquaintances as having an "obsession about informers"—that is, former Communists who have helped our congressional committees and the Department of Justice. Last year he wrote an article for *The Reporter* on "Loyalty, Suspicion and the Tightening Chain." It began:

Benito Mussolini is reported to have admitted in an unguarded moment that he launched Fascism not because there was a real danger that Communism would take over Italy but because he was able to persuade leading groups into believing there was such a danger. The late Duce's principle provides an invaluable insight for understanding the fantastic rise and growth of the Federal government's loyalty-security program.

Mr. Ginsburg then proved to his own satisfaction that "there was no subversive threat to the Federal government" by the time the security program was put into effect. His explanation of President Truman's Loyalty Commission: "To take the heat off the Democratic Party, it was politically expedient to intensify loyalty procedures and investigations, even if inherently that was a wrong thing to do."

Still another staff member is Kenneth Meiklejohn, son of the Subcommittee's expert on the First Amendment, and, like his father, a one-time member of front organizations. As a consultant, the Subcommittee has relied on Miss Eleanor Bontecou, assistant research director

of the civil-liberties project backed by the Rockefeller Foundation at Cornell, whose publications have taken a dim view of the Federal security program, investigating committees, and anti-Communist legislation. She is the recipient of a recent grant from the Fund for the Republic.

Senator Hennings has revealed his own attitude towards security in many speeches and statements. Long before the Subcommittee's hearings opened, he telegraphed his punch. He had "grave doubts" about the legality of the Smith Act, he said, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's upholding its constitutionality. He disparaged the Justice Department's "stable of kept, paid informers" and the Administration's "novel" security program. He referred to the organizations on the Attorney-General's list as "the so-called proscribed organizations." Security procedures were in his eyes "trials for treason."

On three ventures that it is known to have undertaken, the Subcommittee's staff met with stinging defeat. In preparation for its showy hearing in the old Supreme Court chamber, it sent out questionnaires which raised very delicate questions about freedom of religion. Leaders of the three major faiths were deeply disturbed by the nature of the inquiry, and, at a meeting with the Subcommittee, warned that a hearing of the kind Hennings contemplated would cause substantial

damage. The hearing was called off.

A further project with a religious flavor concerned Shinto temples. These were put on the Attorney-General's list in 1945, when General MacArthur, outlawed Shintoism in Japan. Plans were worked out for summoning both Attorney-General Brownell and General MacArthur. Then, after they had been badgered and embarrassed, a genuine Shinto priest was to be brought in, who would explain, and justify, his faith. This delirious scheme is said to have been scotched by Mr. MacDuffie while still chief counsel.

A more serious project was to turn a researcher loose on every word of testimony given by Miss Elizabeth Bentley in the last seven years. She was to be brought before the Subcommittee, cross-examined on such discrepancies (if any) as could be turned up, and, it was hoped, discredited. The staff received a practical example of what a free press can do when Mr. Willard Edwards of the *Chicago Tribune* got wind of the plot, and exposed it.

The Subcommittee held almost daily hearings in the last two weeks of November. The Defense Department was roundly condemned for using activity in Communist fronts, association with, and kinship to, Communists and the use of the Fifth Amendment as security criteria, and for denying honorable discharge, on such grounds, to members of the Armed Forces. The Civil Service Commission was raked over for using the same criteria, and for keeping files on Communists, fellow travelers and Fascists. Witnesses denounced the Administration's use of anonymous informants. Through it all the theme persisted: there's no genuine problem; security systems are the instruments of men with sinister purposes. How much harm this tornado of words has done to the security program the future will show. The transcript of the hearings, when it appears, will be a permanent ammunition dump for its enemies.

As so often happens to Liberals bent on this kind of thing, the Subcommittee found in the Communist Party an unbidden ally. On July 31, Senator Hennings announced the Subcommittee would go into the present state of the Bill of Rights "amendment by amendment, clause by clause." Three days later, on August

Last Week's Puzzle

The companions of Jones were Mrs. Robinson and Miss Brown before lunch, Mrs. Smith and Miss Robinson after lunch, and Mrs. Brown and Miss Smith after tea.

Winners

Prizewinners for the first correct solutions to puzzles thus far have been:

"Exam Time"—Mr. Paul Niemeyer

"At the Browns' Party"—Mr. and Mrs. J. N. Shriver, Jr.

"Aphrodite"—Mr. M. Stanton Evans

3, Claude Lightfoot, one of the convicted Communist leaders, urged a national conference of Party brass to embark on "the struggle to preserve the Bill of Rights," which involves among other things abolishing the security system, Congressional "witch-hunts," and Smith Act prosecutions.

Communist Press Approves

Since then, the Subcommittee has been praised in a number of *Daily Worker* editorials—a violent switch in the *Daily Worker's* customary line with respect to investigating committees. When reports of discord within the Subcommittee's staff were current, the *Daily Worker* cried anxiously that "the country cannot afford to have anything interfere with the actual holding of the investigation," and that "supporters of the Bill of Rights will wish the committee well and hope that it will iron out its problems and move forward." The *Daily Worker* kept its readers informed about the Subcommittee's questionnaires on freedom of religion, speech and press, and begged them to get copies, fill them out and return them. Applications to testify before the Subcommittee have been made by William Z. Foster, and by several Communist fronts, including the Committee to Secure Justice for Morton Sobell (convicted with the Rosenbergs).

Senator Hennings is a Democrat, the Subcommittee has a Democratic majority and, at the start of the investigation, the Democratic leaders of the Senate may have hoped it would serve Party purposes. If it were able to show that government workers let out by the Eisenhower Administration for security reasons were patriotic and cruelly wronged citizens, its findings would mitigate the 1952 Republican accusations of softness towards Communism. Experienced members of both parties, among them Senator McCarthy, now think the Subcommittee has overreached itself. Instead of showing the Administration's security procedures to be unreasonable, it has shown that the Democrats, at least as far as Senator Hennings and his colleagues are concerned, are still soft. The Subcommittee thus presents the Democratic Senate leaders with a potentially explosive issue. Republican orators can be counted on to keep it before their attention.

ON THE LEFT... C. B. R.

Coordination. The ease with which the various parts of the international Communist network interlock is disclosed by certain recent incidents. Having been granted a passport by the State Department, *Daily Worker* correspondent Joseph Clark arrived in Paris for an interview with Jacques Duclos, French Communist National Assembly leader. "It took just a phone call, and the appointment was made," boasts Clark. Later we were informed that B. K. Gebert, former member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, USA, who fled this country in 1947 aboard the Polish ship *Batory*, is now the editor of *Glas Pracy* (Voice of Labor) in Communist Poland.

Red Plums. The international Communist apparatus has handed out some juicy jobs to its American cohorts. Among foreign agents listed by the Attorney General from time to time are the following well-known individuals: Earl Browder, former executive secretary of the Communist Party, USA, representing the following USSR publishing houses: OGIZ, ISKUSSTVO and PROFIZDAT; Frederick V. Field, former *Daily Worker* columnist, representing the Bank of China, China National Aviation Corp., Chinese Postal Remittances & Savings Bank; Travis K. Hedrick, former Federated Press correspondent, representing the USSR Embassy; Harry C. Lamberton, of the National Lawyers Guild, Washington, D. C., representing the Polish Embassy, Czechoslovakian Embassy, Rumanian Legation, USSR Embassy; Bill Mardo, former *Daily Worker* correspondent, representing USSR Information Bulletin; Charles Recht, New York attorney, representing twenty agencies of the USSR; Edwin S. Smith, who refused to affirm or deny Communist Party membership, representing USSR *Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga*, USSR Information Bulletin, *Czechopress*, Czechoslovakian Embassy, *Czechoslovak Life*, China Photo Service, Rumanian *Agerpress*, Rumanian Legation, East Berlin *Zentral Bild*, *Hungarian Bulletin*, Legation of the Hungarian Peoples' Republic; John Stuart, former *New Masses* writer,

representing the Polish Embassy; William Weinstone, Communist leader convicted under the Smith Act, representing *Telepress*, Prague; Nat Einhorn, Fifth Amendment case, representing the Polish Embassy.

It may sound strange in the light of the above facts that on November 16, 1933, Soviet Ambassador Litvinov signed a pledge to President Roosevelt which is still in force, to the effect that "It will be the fixed policy of the Government of the USSR . . . to refrain and to restrain persons in Government service and all organizations of the Government or under its direct or indirect control . . . from any act overt or covert liable in any way whatever to injure the tranquility, prosperity, order or security of the whole or any part of the United States . . ."

Sixteen Years Later. On October 25, 1939, the House Committee on Un-American Activities placed in its record a list of the NLRB members of the Washington branch of the American League for Peace and Democracy, the Communist front. The list was greeted with vilification and ridicule by the liberal press. Included in that list were the following individuals now named by Herbert Fuchs and Mortimer Reimer as members of the Communist Party in testimony before the same committee: Allen Heald, David Rein, Mr. and Mrs. John W. Porter, J. H. Krug, Martin Kurasch and Bernard Stern. In this fast-moving atomic age, a delay of sixteen years or even sixteen days can be tremendously expensive to our national security.

For Children. The Communist Workers Bookshop invites you to purchase "Good books for children." The publishers are Young World Books, which together with the (Communist) International Publishers, has offices at 381 Fourth Avenue, New York. Listed are the following books by authors who have refused to testify regarding their Communist Party membership: "The Secret of Light" by Irving Adler; "How Man Discovered His Body," by Sarah R. Riedman; "From Head to Foot—Our Bodies and How They Work," by Alex Novikoff.

Postscript to 'The New Yorker'

JOHN ABBOT CLARK

Only a year after the sinking of the *Titanic* I was crossing the ocean, and it befell by chance that on the anniversary of that disaster we passed not very far from the spot where the proud ship lay buried beneath the waves. The evening was calm, and on the lee deck a dance had been hastily organized. . . . Almost alone I stood for hours at the railing on the windward side, looking out over the rippling water where the moon had laid upon it a broad street of gold. Nothing could have been more peaceful; it was as if Nature were smiling upon earth in sympathy with the strains of music and the sound of laughter that reached me at intervals from the revelling on the other deck. Yet I could not put out of my heart an apprehension of some lurking treachery in this scene of beauty. . . . Was it not in such a calm as this that the unsuspecting vessel, with its gay freight of human lives, had shuddered, and gone down, forever?

—PAUL ELMER MORE, *Aristocracy and Justice* (1915), pp. 42-43.

We danced aboard the *Normandie* the other night, and moved through the great halls of marble and gold and rubber cement, among the fine people—many of them looking for a drink. We saw the vistas, and the theatre, where the light (according to late publicity advices) "is diffused in luminous grooves." The phrase stuck in our head, and we could have been heard murmuring above the babble of voices, that beautiful line, so pertinent to the sea, "The grooves were God's first temples."

—"The Talk of the Town," June 15, 1935.

I haven't followed *The New Yorker* very closely since 1945; but according to my friends—good Moderns all—the magazine has lost much of its Humanistic fervor and moral drive in recent years. They maintain that while it hasn't exactly gone Modern and come to terms with today's world, it has quite noticeably entered a phase of ethical quietism.

Being a good Modern, I am naturally pleased to hear this. I hope in due time to verify the accuracy of these heartening observations for myself.

If it is true that *The New Yorker* is no longer the implacable enemy of Modernism that it was for so many years, the probable reasons are not far to seek. For one thing, *The New Yorker*, like all magazines, is more or less dependent upon its contributors. The guiding spirits of a journal of opinion can influence the thinking of those who write for it, but only up to a point. Just as *Time* is faced with the problem of how to domesticate its Leftists, so *The New Yorker* has long been faced with the problem of how to humanize its Moderns. (Now and then you can lead a writer to the

works of More and Babbitt, but you can't make them read.)

For another thing, the magazine's founder and longtime editor—not only an amazing man, but a great one—is dead. Moreover, such Humanistic standbys, or at least allies of Humanism, as Lardner, Benchley, Maloney and Hokinson, to name only a few, are also dead. Others, like Clifton Fadiman, have drifted away. While James Thurber and E. B. White have apparently been devoting more and more of their time of late to living the life Humanistic, they have devoted less and less to singing its praises in "The Talk of the Town."

Then again, the magazine may merely be lying idle, merely waiting for the appropriate moment—another Hitler, another Buchenwald, another Hiroshima—to give us Moderns the coup de grace.

Or, assuming that what my friends tell me about *The New Yorker* of recent years is true, it's at least an outside possibility that the magazine's Humanists are nothing more than tired—just plain tired, even a little discouraged, despite all the successes, despite

all the latter-day converts to Humanism, many of them from the oddest quarters imaginable. After all, it must get a little tiring and discouraging to tell people, every other week or so, years on end, that when they hear a strange noise in Flatbush they should turn their thoughts to God rather than Einstein—especially when you know that these people either aren't paying any attention, or, if they are, quite obviously don't understand a thing you're saying.

But whatever the reason, or reasons, for the magazine's alleged loss of zeal, there is no getting around the fact that we Moderns have lost some ground in the last fifteen or twenty years. To this day, of course, no one wants to be called a Humanist to his face (nor even behind his back); nor does anybody want to be thought of as old-fashioned, or on the side of the Medievals and Ancients. Nevertheless, there's no gainsaying that, as of right now, we Moderns are in the unenviable position of finding it hard not to wince perceptibly when the words "liberal," "emancipated," "sophisticated," "broadminded," and the like are thrown around in a quietly desperate spirit of open-boat camaraderie. And I hold, without much fear of contradiction, that *The New Yorker* has been largely responsible for this current uneasiness, this ill-concealed embarrassment on our part.

But fortunately, we Moderns still hold most, if not all, of the important forts. Our control of education, from kindergarten to graduate school, is complete. John Dewey is universally recognized as the grand old man of American philosophy, and the educator's educator par excellence. Now that he is dead, perhaps in the not too distant future he will be—but why waste time speculating about matters which can be taken for granted? Thanks largely to television, ironically enough, traditional ethics and old-fashioned morality enjoyed a mild resurgence a few years ago during the Tobey and Kefauver investigations, but the fad was shortlived. Statistically, religion is showing signs of life, but mainly, we suspect in a drive-in, peace-of-mind, what-to-do until-the-analyst-returns-from-his-vacation sort of way. Our art and music become more Modern with every passing year. Literature has

never been more frank and uninhibited, more lacerating, more shudder-creating, more protoplasmically alive than it is today. Never has Science been more scientific, nor Progress more progressive.

Taking all of these matters into consideration, there is probably scant reason for us Moderns to be putting in any sleepless nights worrying about the ideological foundations of today's world. There are real dangers to those foundations, of course; and we Moderns still have our enemies, make no mistake about it; but Modernism's most subtle enemy all these years, *The New Yorker*, has already, according to my friends, done its worst. The magazine's guns, they tell me, are now spiked, and, like a destroyer in moth balls, it lies quietly at anchor, bothering nobody but its skeleton crew.

Even so, this Modern for one is still assailed by doubts, still not wholly convinced that the danger has passed. Although, as I said at the outset, I haven't followed the magazine closely of late, I see it often enough to know that Phyllis McGinley still contributes her clever homilies and metrical pieties; that amusing coincidences continue to be unamusing to the editors; that the drawings, for the most part, are still on the side of law, order and decorum; that Edmund Wilson not infrequently sounds like Matthew Arnold on casters; that the so-called newsbreaks continue to sow distrust of creativity, unconventionality and rich beautiful prose; that "The Talk of the Town" still sprays acid now and again on Modernism's choicest flowers.

The New Yorker people may be tired, or they may not be. I wouldn't know. But I do know that I'm tired. It's been fun, in a way, going through the huge mass of Humanistic material turned up in the magazine, and it gives me a cozy inner glow to realize that by exposing this material for what it is, I have done more than unmask Modernism's most dangerous enemy. I have unmasked twentieth-century America's most dangerous enemy. For to attack Modernism is to attack contemporary America. But despite this inner glow, despite this consciousness of having performed an important, if modest, public service, I'm worn out.

Others may deal with *The New Yorker* dormant, quiescent, fallow, tired, infiltrated by Moderns, as they

see fit. As for me, I've had a long and harrowing experience of *The New Yorker* militant and deadly and poised for the kill. And my considered advice to all good Moderns is to let sleeping dogmatists lie.

Listening to my not always too reliable friends on the subject of *The New Yorker* today, I find my spirits reviving in no time at all; confidence returns, and I begin to take hope for the future. Perhaps the major threat to our faith in the rightness and soundness of our Modern world has subsided into innocuousness, its claws sheathed forever. But at such moments as these when I am feeling unusually sanguine, all at once I begin to suspect that I am being put upon by optimists or gulled by Liberals. I start thinking of the *Titanic* and *Normandie*, and of what happened to them. And before I know it, I am right back where I have been so many times while engaged upon this exposé—at the concluding paragraph of Paul Elmer More's essay on Thomas Henry Huxley.

Here are the words which have haunted me for so long, and which continue to haunt me, even though, according to my Modern friends, they no longer should:



Irving Babbitt

"We have seen the triumphs of Huxley at Oxford, the seat of his enemies. Let us take leave of this somewhat ungrateful theme by calling up another scene at the same university. In 1864, there was a Diocesan Conference at Oxford. There chanced at this time to be in the neighborhood a man who was neither priest nor scientist, a man given to absurd freaks of intellectual charlatanry, yet showing at times also such marvelous and sudden penetration into the heart of things as comes only to genius. It was Disraeli. 'He lounged into the assembly,' so the scene is described by Froude, 'in a black velvet shooting-coat and a wide-awake hat, as if he had been accidentally passing through the town. . . . He began in his usual affected manner, slowly and rather pompously, as if he had nothing to say beyond perfunctory platitudes.' And then, turning to the presiding officer, the same Bishop Wilberforce whom four years earlier Huxley had so crushingly rebuked, he uttered one of his enigmatic and unforgettable epigrams: 'What is the question now placed before society with a glibness the most astounding? The question is this: Is man an ape or an angel? I, my Lord, am on the side of the angels.' The audience, not kindly disposed to the speaker, applauded the words as a jest; they were carried the next day over the whole land by the newspapers; they have often been repeated as an example of Disraeli's brilliant but empty wit. I suspect that beneath their surface glitter, and hidden within their metaphor pointed to suit an Oriental taste, these words contain a truth that shall some day break to pieces the new philosophy which Huxley spent his life so devotedly to establish."

Could it be that these same words contain the same truth that shall some day break to pieces the new philosophies which men like Marx, Darwin, Freud, Dewey and Russell have worked so devotedly to establish?

The question, I like to think, is purely rhetorical. But it will remain so only if we Moderns begin seeing *The New Yorker* for what it has been all these past years; only if we begin showing our loving gratitude to Evolution by occasionally opening those big, slumbrous, dark-brown eyes It gave us.

Letter From London

F. A. VOIGT

Labor's Defeated Leaders

Mr. Bevan is England's only surviving zealot, the only one, at least, who can move a large gathering, though even he cannot move the nation.

Perhaps he was born out of his time. Had he been a preacher, fifty years ago or more, his oratory might have kindled a powerful revivalist movement, at least in Wales, his own country. His manner is that of a revivalist, but his words are not. The sonorous language of the Bible, so charged with meaning, cannot be replaced by the vocabulary of socialism which no longer has relevance to any vital reality.

But at least he is not cold and colorless. A natural impetuosity animates the blue eyes and the ruddy features. In spite of (or should we say because of?) his bouncing effrontery, he still has something that is of the people, something of earthy emotion. His weekly journal, the *Tribune*, is read by few, but by those few it is read eagerly, in spite of (or because of) its rough insolence and its streak of pharisaical religiosity. Mr. Bevan still carries a challenge which, although embarrassing to his own party, is often a salutary provocation to his opponents.

Despite his adulation of Tito and his belief that the present rulers of Russia are good fellows—even if they are, at times, a bit tough or tactless—Mr. Bevan is hardly a fellow traveler. Tacitus defined the fellow traveler as “neither constant in faith nor strenuous in perfidy.” Mr. Bevan may be erratic, but he has a certain constancy of mind and character. Even those of his fellow Socialists who have been indignant over the harm they think he has done to the party, and will call him misguided, inconsiderate, or irresponsible, will never call him perfidious. The fellow travelers in the House of Commons number perhaps fifty or sixty, or nearly one tenth of the total membership. Mr. Bevan is not to be reckoned among them even if he is often with them.

If anyone deserved to be elected

leader of the Labor Party it was Mr. Morrison (in spite of his age), both by reason of his services to the party and to the country. He was, it is true, a conscientious objector in the First World War, but in the Second he worked for victory with single-minded zeal and solid efficiency. He is a Londoner, almost a Cockney and, therefore, no Communist and no fellow traveler. (No true Londoner could be either.) He hates Communism more and understands it better than many a Conservative does. He can smell Communism and dig it out when others are unaware of its proximity.

Communism is the same everywhere, and Mr. Morrison, having known it in Balham, Tooting, and Whitechapel, knows it wherever it is. He was the one member of the War Cabinet who was disquieted, and deeply so, by Mr. Churchill's infatuation with Tito. Although exceedingly ignorant of Balkan affairs, Mr. Morrison, with his terrier-like instinct, felt that there was something wrong. Tito's profuse exudations of “democracy,” to Mr. Morrison, smelt of Communism. But, despite his instincts, Mr. Morrison lacked the grounded knowledge he would have needed to press his case, and he was unable to shake Churchill's obstinacy that had been hardened by Tito's calculated flattery.

Earl Attlee of Pyrrhia

Earl Attlee's manner is deceptive, although it is not intended to deceive. As a peddler of platitudes, he is only surpassed by Sir Anthony Eden. He is not a furtive man, but his seemingly furtive, almost mousy manner hides a certain shrewdness and toughness, especially in dealing with his fellow Socialists whom he knows so very, very well. (Towards Mr. Churchill, his chief in the War Cabinet, he was merely obsequious.) Even if he is not a mouse—a creature that has, after all, been too much maligned—he has sharp teeth and will, in case of need, administer a dexterous nip, as he has done, upon occasion, to one or the

other of the “intellectuals” in his party—and with instantaneous effect; for inflated vanity offers so large and hypersensitive a surface that one small nip is enough to send a spasm of quivering anguish through the whole distended organism.

It was Mr. Attlee's moderation above all that enabled him to hold the balance between extremes in his party and to make it so effective an instrument of political and economic control over the nation. Before the war, his moderation helped to save the British pacifist movement from its own excesses, thereby increasing the effect of the steady pressure which, by impeding rearmament, made the inevitable war inevitable. Mr. Attlee's moderation did almost as much as Mr. Churchill's powers of persuasion to induce the British people to accept, with hardly a protest, Yalta, Potsdam, and the UN. And it is with unconcealed pride, a pride shared by his party, that he accepts the main responsibility for the premature withdrawal from India which precipitated one of the worst massacres in history, left India divided, and created a yawning vacuum in Asia.

For Socialism, Read Equality

There is hardly a publication issued by the Labor Party or by the Trade Unions that does not, today, admit, even if only by implication, that socialism (as understood in England until well after the year 1945, when the Labor Government won its sweeping victory) is dead. It was killed by socialism itself, as put in force by that Government. To the younger generation, socialism means almost nothing.

The old antithesis “socialism versus capitalism” no longer exists. Even to those who call themselves Socialists, capitalism has come to mean something to be controlled, not to be abolished. There are alternative forms of capitalism, but there is no alternative to capitalism itself.

In 1945, nationalization compromised almost all that was understood by socialism. But nationalization, so energetically carried out by the Labor Government, was a failure from every point of view, including the socialist point of view. The reality of nationalization destroyed the ideal—and the socialist ideal with it.

Today, there is more discontent in

the nationalized industries than in those still privately owned. Many who voted for Labor in 1945 hoped that nationalization would mean self-government in industry. They did not want state capitalism—which is what nationalization gave them. Hardly one of the nationalized industries has earned a sufficient surplus to provide for adequate maintenance. "Nationalization," as a slogan, will catch no more votes in Great Britain.

"Welfare," as understood today, is liberal and conservative, as well as socialist, both in theory and practice; though it was the Labor Government which gave the Welfare State its present distension. It is not capable of further distension, for the financial burden it imposes is far too heavy even now. The slogan "more welfare" will catch no votes.

What, then, has socialism come to mean, or, rather, what does the Labor Party want? The answer is comprised in one word—equality. Not the word "socialism," but the word "equality" is the key to the whole theory and practice of the British labor movement.

Mr. Gaitskell, the newly elected leader of the Party, stated recently that of the "real ideals of socialism . . . the most important . . . is equality," and that "equality" means "a classless society." (Mr. Gaitskell concedes that there must be "differentials of income" according to "skill, responsibility, effort" and so on; though even now the "differentials" are smaller in Great Britain today than they are in the Soviet Union.)

What of liberty and fraternity which Socialists of old rated as highly as equality? Today, equality is pursued to the exclusion of liberty and fraternity. Even the word liberty has grown scarce in socialist writing and speaking, while the word fraternity has fallen into total disuse. (The Socialist International, which was founded to achieve universal fraternity, is dead and only meets to hold a congress of ghosts.)

How is the "classless society" to be achieved? No longer by nationalization or by direct public ownership, but by increasing State participation in private industry, by a process of permeation, as it were, and by enforcing the principle that all things must be equal except the progressive tax-

ation out of which the all-pervading (rather than all-embracing) State and its organs and services are to be financed.

Able and Dangerous

The British Labor movement—the Party and the trade unions—have a new leader, a man who, although a moderate like Mr. Attlee, will not, as Mr. Attlee did, just hold the balance and maneuver to reconcile contraries;

but one who will, rather, strive to extinguish extremes and knit the whole together into one powerful agency for the acquisition of despotic control over a society reduced to servitude by ruthless levelling.

Mr. Gaitskell is the ablest politician in Europe, and perhaps the most dangerous. He is not just a party leader, as Mr. Attlee was, or as Sir Anthony Eden is. He is the principal director, organizer, and promoter of England's creeping revolution.

To Frederic Mistral (Neveu)

On being Crowned with Laurels by the Provençal Poets at Avignon

Of all the immortality concoctors
Who cook their would-be by their
mid-night lamps,
They blame me that I shun my fellow-
doctors
To haunt the quays, the markets, and
the camps.

Yeats on his intellect could pull the
blinds,
Rapping up ghosts. He often fell for
phoneys.
Weird bluestockings, with damp flat-
footed minds,
Theosophists and fakirs, were his cro-
nies.

I, too, can put my Pegasus to graze,
Carouse with gypsy pedlars at the
fair,
Or with the yokelry, on market days,
Jingle in spurs and sheepskins round
the square.

They say it is a waste of time. I
differ.
To learn should be as easy as to look.
You could not pass examinations stif-
fer
Or sweat a deeper learning from the
book.

Than to be passed for native by the
million
When dining-in at horsefairs with my
bid.
This taught me the Gallego and Casti-
lian

By which I know my *Lusiad* and the
Cid.

Comradeship, though the system be
antique,
Is all the anthropology I know.
The Zulu and Swahili that I speak
I learned no more than water learns
to flow.

Collective writers at my name grow
raucous,
The schools of pedants cackle to the
sky
Like the New Critics, or the Kenyon
Caucus,
Or poultry—when a falcon cruises
by!

I've had my spell of solitude and cav-
erns:
What mountaintops could teach I
learned of old,
But got the true Provençal in the
taverns
By which I sailed into the Isles of
Gold,

To sit with Mistral under the green
laurels
From which his children gathered me
my crown,
While the deep wine, that is the end
of quarrels,
Glows through me like the sunset go-
ing down.

ROY CAMPBELL



The Scholarly Journals

FRANK S. MEYER

Confusion in the Court

At the risk of trespassing on the terrain of this magazine's legal expert, I should like to discuss a controversy about the rationale of latter-day Supreme Court decisions, which has been sputtering away in the journals of political science for the past year or two. I do so because this controversy involves considerations that go far beyond the strictly legal sphere. At a point of immense practical importance, it reflects the radical moral philosophical crisis of contemporary thought about man and society.

So far as political scientists are concerned, the issue was joined, and the problem most cogently and honestly stated, in two articles by Earl Latham of Amherst—"The Majoritarian Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court" and "The Supreme Court and the Supreme People," which appeared respectively in *Confluence* and the *Journal of Politics* a year or two ago. Mr. Latham writes:

Since 1937, the Supreme Court . . . has tried to distinguish between the rights of economic minorities and those of non-economic minorities. The Court has attempted to subordinate the first to the desires of legislative majorities; and to exalt the second above legislative majorities. Because it has surrendered authority on the first, it has had difficulty holding its authority on the second. . . . It is probably more than a cliché that freedom is whole and indivisible; and that a policy of freedom for some but not for others makes partisans out of jurists. [*Confluence*, Dec. 1953]

He describes with sharp sardonicism the confusion of doctrine in the Court, which has ensued in recent years from its effort to find a conceptual basis upon which it could defend non-economic rights when it has given up the conceptual basis upon which it had previously defended both economic and non-economic rights.

Mr. Latham does not, however, in my opinion, recognize the character of that confusion. At best he skirts the real issue, which is a philosophical one, basing his criticism on the surface level of minority versus majority, and

ignoring almost altogether the underlying moral question of the ground from which rights derive. For the origin of the confusion is purely philosophical: the pragmatic denial of immutable moral principle as the basis of jurisprudence. Therefrom arises the continuing attrition of the constitutional doctrine that the basic rights of life, liberty, and property are integral to the individual and beyond the just power of any government to abrogate.

But although Mr. Latham avoids the fundamental issue, he has, at any rate, stirred up the doves. The challenge he has presented has evoked an indignant and varied Liberal reaction, whether avowedly directed toward his articles or not. The pragmatic chickens hatched by a generation of jurists in the ethically relativist tradition of Justice Holmes have come home to roost. The concept of fundamental law grounded in moral principle and standing above the will of a popular majority was fair enough game when it stood in the way of welfarist raids upon private property. But when the decay of that concept produces a Supreme Court vacillating and unsure in its approach to "the civil rights of minorities," it becomes a different matter.

Now I am not minimizing the importance of "the civil rights of minorities," if by that is meant the basic liberties of the persons who make up such minorities, and not simply the right of minorities who constitute powerful enough voting blocs to enforce special privilege for themselves over against the liberties of other individuals and to the detriment of the rule of law that makes all liberties possible. But there is a certain grim humor—or would be if what is at stake were not so portentous for the survival of freedom—in the wriggings of the Liberal mind groping for a firm foundation in the bog of moral relativism it has itself created.

Typical of the kind of argument I have in mind, and of the reaction to Mr. Latham's analysis, are the articles of John P. Roche of Haverford, "Judicial Self-Restraint" (*American Political Science Review*, Sept. 1955); of Loren P. Beth of the University of

Florida, "The Case for Judicial Protection of Civil Liberties" (*Journal of Politics*, Feb. 1955); and of Donald Meiklejohn of the University of Chicago, "Labels and Libertarians" (*Ethics*, Oct. 1955).

Mr. Roche disposes of the whole matter by sneering with scientific superiority:

Every society, sociological research suggests, has its set of myths which incorporate and symbolize its political, economic, and social aspirations. Thus, as medieval society had the Quest for the Holy Grail and the cult of numerology, we, in our enlightened epoch, have as significant manifestations of our collective hopes the dream of impartial decision-making. . . . While this dream of objectivizing political Truth is in no sense a unique American phenomenon, it is surely true to say that in no other democratic nation has the effort been carried so far and with such persistence. . . . the greatest hopes for injecting pure Truth-serum into the body politic have been traditionally reserved for the federal judiciary, and particularly for the Supreme Court.

Mr. Beth and Mr. Meiklejohn, however, represent another point of view, one less simply relativist, more consonant with the new search for some "objective" foundation for the *demi-vierge* "democratic welfare state." They want a theory that will firmly establish the right kind of rights while smothering unprofitable questions about the wrong kind. They argue that, while majorities and social engineers may "modify" the rights of property and of due process of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the rights of the First Amendment are "preferred rights" — "not that [God save the mark!] free speech is a great philosophical value in the abstract; it is instead that no democratic society can endure without such freedom: a supremely practical consideration." (Beth, *Journal of Politics*)

For many years, pragmatic political and juridical theory has subordinated the rights of property to the higher judgment of the masses, or of those who demagogically speak for the masses, in the name of a clear-sighted realism which dispels the fogs of metaphysics. Now, therefore, it is a little hard to vindicate the rights of personal freedom on philosophical grounds. But some foundation firmer than the will of a passing majority is needed, so they are vindicated on the grounds of their usefulness to the con-

tinuity of the democratic process.

It is in vain that Donald Meiklejohn, who places his defense of the "preferred rights" of the First Amendment on this same basis, inveighs against C. H. Pritchett's insistence "that the American Constitution is a pragmatic affair." His own position, like Mr. Beth's, is itself grounded in a hardly less pragmatic differentiation between democratically expendable rights of property (which, Mr. Beth implies, are but formulas that "enjoin us to preserve competition, or poverty, or unemployment, or segregation") and contemporaneously useful, therefore valuable, rights of personal liberty.

The Liberal, then, now wants a higher status for certain parts of the Bill of Rights than the merely pragmatic role of "counsels of moderation" to the legislature, which Judge Learned Hand assigned it. And this poses a problem. For without judicial review, how can even the First Amendment be protected from legislative majorities? But if the assumption of an underlying moral standard expressed in the Constitution, by which all positive law is to be measured, is pragmatically rejected, whence can the Court derive justification for judicial review?

Essentially, Mr. Meiklejohn's answer is that the standard is to be found in the social norm. Since we all believe in democracy and since the political scientists can tell us that without the guarantees of the First Amendment "the community does not achieve that wise and representative quality in its judgments which is the heart of self-government," the First Amendment has a "preferred status" denied to other Constitutional guarantees. What this comes to is that neither the dictates of the moral law nor the express prescriptions of the written constituent law of the nation, which incorporates them, have authority sufficient to override the majesty of majorities; but any dogma to which the social scientist gives the accolade of his behavioral investigation has that authority.

Thus, the Supreme Court itself in the school desegregation case based its decision not upon moral truth and constitutional prescription, but founded its rejection of the "separate but equal" doctrine largely upon the expertism of half a dozen sociologists and psychologists.

In analyzing the mechanisms of this

rationale, I neither want to depreciate in any way the rights of the First Amendment nor have I intended here to take a position on the complex problem of desegregation. What I am trying to emphasize is the speciousness of the scientific concepts of objectivity which underlie that sociological jurisprudence that seems to be replacing legal positivism.

In substance Mr. Meiklejohn's argument is based upon the assumption that democracy is a good, since it can be sociologically determined that the people of the United States want it; that the guarantees of the First Amendment are essential to the continuance of democracy, while the rights of property, by implication, are not; that therefore, whatever the Constitution may say, there is an objective basis for one set of rights and not for the other.

The difficulty is, however, that the standards based on this kind of "objectivity" are without force or substance, because a moral concept of what ought to be, as distinguished from what is, is totally lacking. The standards by which the acts of executive and legislature are to be judged under the Constitution become nothing but the assessments by social scientists of what majority consensus is. Surely that consensus could be better determined by elections and plebiscites; and if a dictatorship of the majority over the individual and the minority is what we want, it might just as well be arrived at directly, without the interposition of social scientists.

But the rule of law, based upon principles of justice morally derived, is the principle of free constitutions, most especially of the American. It is not necessary to hold to any particular metaphysic or theology to recognize the intrinsic problem: that the positive experience which the scientific method investigates cannot by itself be the source of standards, of values, of ideals, by which all conduct (including governmental conduct, even the conduct of democratic governments) can be judged. As Henry S. Kariel of Harvard writes in the *Western Political Quarterly* (Sept. 1955):

Any theory . . . which makes the ideal and real synonymous eliminates the tension between . . . fact and value. To

dispel this tension is to make it impossible to advance a political theory as ideal, as true, as just. Indeed the very notion of justice becomes irrelevant . . . the very pursuit of truth becomes an irrational endeavor. Once metaphysics providing terms by which troubled individuals might assess moving events, historical states, and political behavior has been dismissed, man's claim to make meaningful distinctions, ascribe values, and exercise his reason becomes impertinent.

If the only defense of rights rests upon standards derived from the scientific investigation of society, then the rights of political and civil liberty will be completely at the mercy of social-scientific modes as the rights of property have been. The winds are indeed blowing that way. Much of sociological theory, much of the theory of "interpersonal psychiatry" would eliminate the individual completely from consideration, since, as B. F. Skinner, Professor of Psychology of Harvard, puts it:

In turning to the external conditions which shape and maintain the behavior of men, while questioning the reality of inner qualities and faculties to which human achievements were once attributed, we turn from the ill-defined and remote to the observable and manipulable.

His article, entitled "Freedom and the Control of Men" (*The American Scholar*, Winter 1955-56), is an outright call for the rejection of traditional ideas about freedom. We must reconsider "our attitude toward freedom—or its reciprocal, the control of human behavior." It is old-fashioned and prevents us from following the dictates of science. It stands in the way of our accepting "the fact that some kind of control of human behavior is inevitable," and impedes "wise decision," misleading us so that "we refuse to engage in control when valuable results might be forthcoming."

This is the direction in which sociological objectivism as a basis for law and morals leads. There is no middle position. Either standards derived from the moral order by reason operating within tradition will protect the human rights that stem from that order; or everything is in neutral flux, to be moulded for expedient reasons by the high priests of a "science of man," guided by nothing but their itch for control in the testing of successive hypotheses.

THE IVORY TOWER

WM. F. BUCKLEY, JR.

On the Inculcated and the Inculcators

The victim of skillful inculcation not only comes out thinking what the inculcator wants him to think, but is altogether positive that he has arrived at his position by independent intellectual exertion. Such a man is, predictably, outraged at the suggestion that he is flesh-and-blood tribute to the success of his indoctrinators; and gets really sore when you cite his yelps of protest as still *additional* evidence of how good a job was done on him. In debating with James Wechsler recently at Harvard, on the question "The Non-Conformist: Liberal or Conservative?", I encountered the usual half-amused, half-sullen exasperation with me for venturing to predict just what would be the audience reaction to the subject Mr. Wechsler and I were going to talk about. I could make a prediction with robust certitude for so simple a reason as that I have a general knowledge as to what goes on in representative American colleges and universities, and I happen to know they are staffed largely by Liberal indoctrinators, and expert ones at that. (By the way, an indoctrinator is not necessarily ignorant or superficial. Socrates was one; so was Rousseau.)

I reminded the audience that, though Liberals do a great deal of talking about hearing other points of view, it sometimes shocks them to learn that there are other points of view. Such a point as I was at Harvard to make, for example: which was, essentially, that there is, for the most part, only one point of view at Harvard, and it happens to be Liberal.

The major colleges in America, which is where opinion-makers get their opinions, tend to be centers of Liberal conformity, I argued—against Mr. Wechsler's insistence that businessmen and George Sokolsky run the affairs of the nation—and I advanced certain data I deemed relevant. Apart from academic data, I had with me certain statistics gathered in the fall of 1952 by the Harvard paper, the *Crimson*, which were revealing. Their

poll was a simple one, asking merely which Presidential candidate, Stevenson or Eisenhower, was favored. The Freshman class (which had spent only about five weeks at Harvard) voted Republican, 3-2. Upper-classmen, by contrast, voted Democratic — 5-4. Graduate students voted Democratic, 2-1. The graduate faculty of Harvard voted Democratic, 4-1. Certainly the figures argue, implicitly, that the better educated you are, the more Liberal you tend to be. The figures indicate that the popular thesis that "the more you know the more conservative you become" is romantic—the kind of thing Mr. Wechsler's businessmen like to think; the figures, indeed, indicate that it is more nearly the other way around, since we must assume that professors are better educated than their students; even at Harvard.

At Yale University, at exactly the same time, asking exactly the same questions, polls revealed a bitter political division among the faculty of the Law School, where the vote was Democratic, by 14-1. At the Divinity School (another civil war) Democratic by 13-2. And so it goes.

Yet any generalization, however moderate, as to the prevalence of political Liberalism in the academic world is greeted, if not with violence, certainly with wonderment. And any proposal to launch an investigation, even a non-congressional one, of the kind NATIONAL REVIEW announced two weeks ago, meets with outraged protests centering on the Privacy of the Classroom. Professors tend these days to talk about their classrooms as though they were connubial couches.

I contended at Harvard that the great Liberal vulnerability rests in the conflict between the symbols under which they operate, all of which abjure indoctrination and welcome dissent, and their method of operation, which all too often is that of unabashed indoctrination and ruthless persecution of conservative dissent. The Liberals

cannot put it over indefinitely, I said. Sooner or later they will have to give something up. Then they will have to decide what it is they treasure more—their symbols or their conformity. The audience was vastly amused.

But there are signs that the leadership on the basis of which the Liberals continue to ask for the allegiance of the community just isn't enough, these days, to get by. St. Peter is said to have told John D. Rockefeller senior to take his ten cents and go to hell. These days one occasionally hears such talk — among students and recent graduates. Harvard now has a dissenting weekly newspaper called the *Times-Republican*. Its first issue featured a piece by a recent graduate, William A. Rusher '48, which is as accurate a translation of *Mene Mene Tekel Upharsin* as I have ever seen. Get a load of this:

The most cursory review of history will bring to mind many nations and communities which have flourished like the green bay tree without any particular pretensions to cultural or intellectual preeminence . . . The one sin for which nature exacts the supreme penalty of national extinction is a failure on the part of the members of a society to believe its inherent worth.

In the United States today, there are many people, dangerously many, who have lost their faith in the American society. I am not referring to the domestic Communists—though they of course have condemned the society to death, and welcome each sign of weakness. The great bulk of those who have lost faith in the society, however, are not actively disloyal to it; they have merely become indifferent or hostile to its tenets. They exist in both parties and all economic and social strata, for theirs is a fraternity of the intellect.

. . . To the holders of such opinions, the preservation of the American society as such can mean little. Deprived by their materialistic premises of the ability to accept its moral postulates, and unable for the same reason to formulate others of their own, they accept the protection of the American society while denying it their moral support — constantly refining their analyses of its defects, and guiltily identifying themselves with its active enemies . . .

The great majority of the American people are now convinced that the struggle for survival must not be led, on behalf of the American society, by some doubt-ridden egghead exquisitely poised between Yea and Nay. The world will go—and perhaps rightly—to those who want it most. If it is to go to the defenders of freedom, they must want that freedom not merely in order to doubt, but to believe.

ARTS and MANNERS

WILLIAM S. SCHLAMM

The Cartoonist as Politician

Every society, it seems, has the Daudier it deserves, and ours has "Herblock." Now "Herblock" (Herbert Block, born 1909 in Chicago) is not at all a bad cartoonist, and he has some of the fast intelligence which leads other people, if they don't watch out, into writing editorials for the Liberal press. In fact, I am willing to concede that "Herblock" is the most acute editorial mind among the artists. But I am not at all sure that the muses have kissed the man. I am, on the other hand, reasonably sure that, while Honoré Daumier's drawings have been getting better every day, for almost a hundred years, the lifetime of an authentic "Herblock" is about twenty-four hours.

Simon & Schuster, a New York publishing firm which has vastly different ideas about longevity in our culture, have just put out a book that contains no less than two hundred and fifty cartoons and thirty thousand words of text by Herbert Block (*Herblock's Here and Now*, price \$2.95). I've looked at all these cartoons, and I've read every one of the thirty thousand words—and I'm mesmerized into a state comparable only to the weird experience a Western mind suffers when it is exposed to Tibetan prayer mills: their tirelessly repeated little sentences, distressingly monotonous, add up to a ritual which is indubitably genuine but remains sadly alien to the Western mind. I have no doubt that Mr. Block is moved by something, but I have not the slightest idea what it might be. And though I can see what made him the nation's most effective political cartoonist, I regret this for purely esthetic reasons even more than for political ones.

Like most other practitioners of his trade, Mr. Block sees himself as quite an iconoclast. That is, he persuades himself every day that he has just shattered an important social prejudice, if not drawn a daring moustache on a national Mona Lisa; while in truth he has merely illustrated a fashionable political cliché. He does this, every day, in the *Washington*

Post and Times Herald, a paper that frequently accomplishes the amazing feat of making the *New York Times* look not only conservative but downright fair. In addition, "Herblock's" cartoons are syndicated to more than one hundred and fifty newspapers; and so it is safe to assume that they are seen, every day, by more than ten million people, including all our Federal legislators. Which makes Mr. Block a political force all right, but (I regretfully insist) still not an artist.

To be an artist, the cartoonist (i.e., a designer who is provoked by the fleeting event rather than the notorious inner voice) must have a personal viewpoint, or at least a personal grudge, and above all a personal style. "Herblock" has neither. Everything he draws is as competent a piece of draftsmanship as the blueprint in a Do-It-Yourself kit. And I shall gladly admit that one could identify a "Herblock" from far away. But the recognition would be due to the unmistakable editorial bias of the cartoon—not to an unmistakable personal style.

The Cartoonist as Writer

Which does not mean, however, that "Herblock" has at least that other earmark of an artist-cartoonist, namely, the personal viewpoint. The eye-shattering editorial bias of his cartoons is, in disillusioning truth, the orthodox party line of Americans for Democratic Action, a notoriously artless political cabal. I must admit that Mr. Block presents that bias with a wild abandon and a nerve for exaggeration which strikes me as genuinely funny; but I have the sneaking suspicion that he wouldn't understand what I am talking about. For, instead of using exaggeration as a deliberate and conscious artistic tool (which is unquestionably the artist-cartoonist's license), Mr. Block means to say, in deadly earnest, that in the very exaggeration he is depicting reality itself.

This, come to think of it, is not just a hunch but, thanks to Simon & Schuster, a part of the objective record. Maybe Mr. Block should not have yielded to the tempting whispers of his pub-

lishers and should not have written those thirty thousand words; as he did, he over-articulated. And we have it now straight from the artist that he ain't one. He is, Mr. Block wants us to know, a politician.

This, as the saying goes, is a free country, and Mr. Block can play at anything he pleases, for instance at being a politician. But for the life of me I can't think of a reason why ten million people should pay attention to Mr. Block's political findings which, to tell the truth, are not only wrong but stupid. (In a discourse on economics, he says, on page 237: "We wouldn't have to show a profit on everything, we could say it's for the people, and any deficit would be charged up to the people in the annual assessments.") Which is the kind of statement we used to invent, for amusement in the wee hours, in the freshman year of economics; such as the immortal insight that poverty is due to the lack of purchasing power.) No, the ten million people, one suspects, turn to "Herblock" because they assume that his art illuminates even though his thinking obscures.

The Cartoonist as Nothing at All

In that, I am afraid, ten million Americans can be wrong. What Mr. Block's "art" illuminates is merely the brazen obscurantism of those Progressive politicians who deem themselves "enlightened." Actually, of course, they are scared stiff by taboos and worship fetishes and, in general, behave like the most superstitious tribe of primitives. It is a pity that the American political cartoon got stuck in this rut. Gone is the passionate whim, the personal aggressiveness, the delightfully outrageous exaggeration of the artist-cartoonist. Instead, we are getting fed the sly political argument, the crooked party line, the calculating "realism" of the "commercial artist" who happens to have specialized in newspaper work. It's a living, to be sure, but it surely won't last.

Mr. Block has twice been awarded the Pulitzer Prize and once the Sidney Hillman Award for Nonfiction. If fiction is the only legitimate environment of art, and Sidney Hillman the institutionalized saint of this country's tensely dedicated Left, then Mr. Block is entitled to get the Sidney Hillman Award for Nonfiction a second time.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

Dead Thomas and Peeping Brinnin

EDWARD CASE

In *Dylan Thomas In America*, subtitled *An Intimate Journal* (Atlantic-Little Brown. 303 pp. \$4.00), John Malcolm Brinnin has committed as shocking and unforgivable a breach of taste and feeling as has ever borne the imprint of a reputable publishing house. Mr. Brinnin has hurtled into print with a needless book, a book which needlessly soils the remembrance of one of the greatest creative artists of the century, a book which will be a dark wound forever in the souls of Thomas' wife and small children, a book which will moisten the tongue of scandal and disfigure the lives of many innocent people whose most private affairs are explicitly related.

Dylan Thomas, the Welsh poet, died in New York on November 9, 1953, at the age of thirty-nine. He was esteemed, by almost all who view contemporary poetry with alertness and understanding, as the foremost lyric poet in English of modern times. Not since Yeats had the English tongue been intoned with such piercing sweetness and nobility. (This was, in abundant measure, the verdict not only of ordinary readers but also of Dylan Thomas' fellow poets. He seemed like a force of nature.)

Almost alone among the poets of his generation he became a public figure in a manner reminiscent of the great days of English lyric verse, when a Byron or a Shelley captured the imaginations of both lovers of poetry and lovers of poets. (Despite earlier excesses of obscurity and wildness in imagery, his was the pure and ecstatically stabbing lyric cry in all its rarity and loneliness. Dylan Thomas was a genius.)

He had an uncanny ability to move a vast audience with the sonorous beauty of his incomparable speaking voice. He was a remarkable speaker of poetry, as the recordings he left behind will immortally attest, and it was as the result of this gift that he came to America on the first of his reading tours early in 1950 at the invitation and under the auspices of John Malcolm Brinnin, who had just been appointed director of a well-known poetry center in New York. Mr. Brinnin's book is the chronicle of his relationship with the poet thereafter, both in the United States and in Britain, where Brinnin visited him. Mr. Brinnin tells all.

There is no point in dwelling unduly

on what he tells. He tells of Thomas' alcoholism, of which he died; of his self-afflicted and troubled spirit; of his amorous affairs, naming only the first names of the feminine parties, but identifying them otherwise so that they must readily be known to everybody in the circles in which they move, which means everybody likely to be of importance in the compass of their lives; he tells of Thomas' relationship to his wife, Caitlin, and to his beautiful children, in terms which are far less than merciful. He was a guest in Dylan Thomas' home and reports everything he saw, yet not once does it seem to have occurred to him that sometimes honor and reticence are inseparable. He tells everything he knew about Dylan Thomas and the people whose lives the poet crossed in three last years of life, and if he spares anyone at all, it can only be himself.

There is a pitiful and distraught statement by Caitlin Thomas which was graciously allowed at the beginning of the volume. In this cry from the heart, which takes less than a page,

Caitlin Thomas says: "It is impossible to hit back at a man who does not know that he is hitting you, and who is far too cautious of the laws of libel to say plainly what can only be read between the lines." And she goes on to say that she will tell the truth about Dylan Thomas. "And I hope it is a better truth than Brinnin's."

But perhaps more can be read between the lines than even Caitlin Thomas saw. For, where did all these lines come from? How, and with what purpose, were they gathered?

The author is at pains to condemn the hangers-on, those who used Dylan Thomas for their own ends, those who in their own dissipation encouraged the poet in his, those who viewed him as a performer or a lion rather than as a man. He mentions, with contempt, a typical party: "He had come for a good time; instead he was being cornered. . . . One of the wives had even gone so far as to sit with a notebook, pencil in hand, to take down whatever might fall from the lips of this bardic clown."

Yet Brinnin must have run to his own notebook every time he left the presence of his subject. How else would he be able to chronicle exact details of conversations, clothing, persons, numbers and kinds of drinks consumed, food eaten, places visited, weather, stops en route, days and dates, and all the minutiae that in ordinary life we forget a week later? He, too, was making the most out of Dylan Thomas. His notes had their own purpose. This was Boswell on the sly, and a Johnson too trusting and burdened to notice. Yes, much can be read between the lines.

The emotional impulse behind Brinnin's book seems to be strangely complicated and ill-defined, affording curious substance for speculation if one were so inclined. Yet he writes well, with mordant clarity and precision. He conveys his view of the formidable personality who is his subject in effective, and in the case of the deathbed scenes, powerful terms. He knows the tools of his trade.

But despite this merit in his careful execution, this book is good for nothing. It hurts the living and does not illuminate or compassionate the dead. It is good for no one, least of all for the author. If he had waited fifty years . . . well, that would be another story. But he didn't wait. Somehow, he couldn't. John Malcolm Brinnin is in a hurry, and he wears hob-nailed boots. His heedless passage will leave its scars.

Let us hope that some part of the considerable royalties and profits made on this volume will be turned over to Dylan Thomas' children, who will soon be old enough to read it.

Bibliographophilia

The Prospects for Communist China, by W. W. Rostow and Associates. 379 pp. Cambridge and New York: The Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and John Wiley & Sons. \$5.00

W. W. Rostow is plant superintendent of an automated scholarship factory operated under M.I.T. In 1953 he directed production of *The Dynamics of Soviet Society*. His present book dates from about a year ago, so a new model will no doubt be on display soon in the dealers' showrooms.

The Prospects for Communist China is pretty dull, but I spent a meditative hour with the bibliography. Do they not say that a professor is known by the bibliography he keeps?

This M.I.T. bibliography is, in the first place, big—forty-seven fine-print pages. This gives Rostow & Co. plenty of room for hospitality. He has a warm lodging for Edgar Snow and Nym Wales, Gunther Stein and Ted White, Kate Mitchell, Owen Lattimore, John K. Fairbank and Anna Louise Strong, a whole galaxy indeed of those bright stars of the Institute of Pacific Relations who have been identified as having shed Communist or pro-Communist light on modern China. But engineer Rostow is a gracious host. He brings forward no tactless reminder of that unfortunate side of his guests' social background. Owen Lattimore's *Inner Asian Frontiers* contains "basic data," and his *Pivot of Asia* "is particularly useful." Kate Mitchell (for long Assistant to the Secretary-General of IPR, frequenter of Mos-

cow salons and offices, prominent in *Amerasia*, identified under oath as a party member) has, in *Industrialization of the Western Pacific*, written "the best single survey in English." The bibliography mentions Edgar Snow's *Red Star Over China* as "this famous book," and stresses the "first hand accounts" by Mrs. Snow (Nym Wales). John K. Fairbank has to his credit "a comprehensive basic work."

The bibliography does observe that Gunther Stein (who skipped the country after it became known that he had been a member of the Sorge espionage ring) is "occasionally overfacile." But this is counterbalanced by the fact that Stein has "long experience in China and gives many facts." Harold R. Isaacs' avowedly Marxist book is described as "a careful historical study."

On the official IPR magazine, *Pacific Affairs*, so persuasively nourished under Owen Lattimore's editorship, the complete comment of the bibliography is: "Published quarterly by the Institute of Pacific Relations at Richmond, Va. A fundamental source on Far Eastern affairs with contributions by well-known scholars and men of affairs. Carries frequent informative, critical articles on China which are usually well documented."

Do not think, however, that the bibliography is so restrained as never to warn unwary readers. The Chinese Nationalist Government's news agency is "not very informative"—it will save us a lot of time to know that. Colonel Rigg's pioneer study of Red Army methods "is fairly technical," and presumably boring. David Dallin's *The Rise of Russia in Asia* is "less helpful on Chinese attitudes." Edward Hunter's *Brain Washing in Red China* is "emotional," and Father Mark Tennien, poor man, is "passionately anti-Communist." Karl Wittfogel is still further into the depths—with scholarly precision he is described as an "ex-Communist," a term which the bibliography evidently considers more relevant to scholarly appraisal than "Communist."

As I was drawing toward the end of the forty-seven pages, I had a vague sense of something missing. Of course the bibliography defined itself as "selective," and did not pretend to be complete. No doubt punch card machines made the final choices for inclusion and exclusion. But it did

seem unusual from the viewpoint of statistical probabilities that the electrons happened to leave out all of the early Comintern resolutions and reports; Stalin on the national question; Borkenau's *History of the Communist International*; Freda Uteley; John Powell, Senior; Eudocio Ravines; William Bullitt; General Charles Willoughby; George Taylor; William McGovern; all of Trotsky's writings on China; Douglas MacArthur; all reference to Richard Sorge and his apparatus; all the testimony on the Korean War of the five commanders (Stratemeyer, Joy, Clark, Almond, Van Fleet); and all fourteen volumes of testimony on the IPR.

Perhaps the machines working on this China Bibliography were the same that made the selections for the Fund for the Republic's Bibliography on American Communism. J. B.

Intellectual Booby Trap

The Red Umbrellas, by Kelvin Lindemann. 214 pp. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. \$3.50

The first epidemic of Asiatic cholera to sweep Europe provides the framework for this novel. The setting is Copenhagen, July 17, 1834. The summer atmosphere is pervaded by the unreality of the battlefield or the concentration camp, and the dead and dying of the plague are being carried away in the midst of persisting civilized routines that have become meaningless. The Marchioness Hermione Schnell, aged 80, has remained in her palace, gallantly refusing to follow the aristocracy in its flight to the country, and the story, or more properly the stories, told at her dinner table, celebrate the birthday of her sixty-year-old friend, Professor Charles Iselin. The only other guest is Madame von der Hooglant, whose manor house is near Elsinore.

The story is told in a way that suggests light-hearted or dexterous manipulation of historical philosophical profundities, far short of the seriousness its materials call for. The book is, moreover, an intellectual booby trap. It is filled with artful and well-phrased references to the topical interests of the intelligentsia (or with references not quite up-to-date, but not altogether old-fashioned), and is

concerned throughout with an identification of the value of the aristocracy and the concerns of the intellectual life. At her dinner party, the Marchioness announces that while in the past they have amused themselves with tales of romance and villainy, tonight each is to tell a story based on

the theme of that interesting little book which is called *A Conception of Fear with Particular Regard to Religious Feeling*. It may interest you to know who the author is. You surely remember Michael Kierkegaard, the hose pedlar, who, my maids tell me, sold such excellent stockings? Well, the author, "Vigilius Haufniensis," is none other than his thinnish and timid son Soren.

The tale that the Marchioness tells is of her girlhood friend, Charlotte d'Armans, who turns out to be Charlotte Corday, the assassin of Marat—a girl so pure and beautiful that after she was decapitated by the guillotine the executioner could not resist pinching her cheeks. Madame von der Hooglant, who is [subtly] of coarser fiber than the austere Marchioness, counters with a story of the legendary Marques de Zarapanda, the Spanish ambassador, who is ultimately discovered to be the devil. Professor Iselin in turn relates the tale of Count Fersen and the red umbrellas, which gives the book its title. Fersen was the Swedish minister in Paris who tried to save Marie Antoinette from the guillotine. The King handed him a red umbrella as the royal pair was taken away, as a token of his gratitude, and Fersen was subsequently killed in Sweden by a mob whose forceful elements carried red umbrellas.

It is impossible not to admire the ease with which antiquarian details are handled, given contemporary significance, and combined to recreate the intellectual climate of the 1830's. The author's familiarity with unfamiliar historical sidelights results in a mild half-parody of antiquarian pedantry—the background of Pope Pius the Ninth, known as "Jackie" in his youth, the scandal of Lord Sandwich, the casual references to landowners "with ironworks in Norway." There are stories within each story, the story that Count Fersen tells within Count Fersen's story, each leading to something else, all with the relevant discursiveness of Saint-Simon. And they are encased in a central complexity, the ancient conflict of the Marchioness and the wealthy commoner Madame

von der Hooglant, whose solution may be likened to the solving of a cryptogram. Once the code is revealed it hardly seems necessary for the reader to go back over the message and see whether it really fits. It is impossible also not to admire the ease, or even the charm, with which the author moves lightly over subjects like God, the devil, destiny, the meaning of life, in what appears to be a mild parody of the intellectual small-talk of our own time. And it is impossible also not to feel that the book is composed of these elements, rather than inspired by their consideration.

The author, Kelvin Edward Lindemann, is a Danish novelist, who enjoys considerable popularity in Scandinavia. One of his ancestors was a governor of Danish Guinea from 1766 to 1768, and another a governor of the Danish West Indies from 1798 to 1801. His first novel to be published in the United States was *The House with the Green Tree*, which dealt with three generations of a Danish merchant family. During the second World War, Lindemann was active in the Danish underground, and smuggled more than a hundred Danish Jews into Sweden by fishing boat, with no arrests or loss of life. *The Red Umbrellas* reaches us with the highest praise of Mika Waltari, Gilbert Highet, and a number of Danish critics who consider it a masterpiece. It is compared most frequently with Isak Dinesen's *Seven Gothic Tales*. Actually, it seems more closely modeled on the nineteenth century Swiss writers who are now having a slight revival, on stories like Conrad Meyer's *Plautus in the Nunnery* or Jeremias Gotthelf's *Die Schwarze Spinne*.

ROBERT CANTWELL

Cavalier Treatment

Economics and Action, by Pierre Mendes-France and Gabriel Ardant. 222 pp. New York: UNESCO and Columbia University Press. \$3.50

The "action" the authors recommend for the modern Western economy consists of highly progressive taxation at all times, large-scale government expenditure during slack periods, and the use of such "scientific" advances against inflation as rationing, compulsory saving and blocked purchasing

power during periods of inflationary pressure.

Their program is based on these underlying premises:

First, that scientific economics, except for the J. M. Keynes of *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* and the members of what Keynes termed "the brave . . . heretics" (Major Douglas, J. A. Hobson and "the strange, unduly neglected prophet," Silvio Gesell), has developed neither appropriately general theories nor useful rules of governmental policy;

Second, that a modern capitalist economy is faced with chronic "over-production" as a consequence of inadequate investment opportunity and unequal distribution of income;

Third, that the principles of "classical" economics and the tradition of its foremost adherents have an entirely laissez-faire basis. (The authors unearth a "liberal" and presumably classical economist named Rueff, who opposed unemployment relief as artificially maintaining excessively high wage levels, as a prime example of the classical position. (They could profitably read Lionel Robbins' *The Theory of Economic Policy*.)

Economics and Action, while something of a mixed bag, does us the service of crystallizing the central fallacies of what has in our generation come to be known as the "liberal" position. It reveals the indifference of the "left" to the demonstrated fact that free economic association can take place only within a free market, which is in fact the major premise of the classical position. It grossly misrepresents the classical monetary policy, which is in fact one of great vigor. Bagehot in the last century, and Henry Simons and Lloyd Mints among others in this, have repeatedly stressed the need for operational control of the money supply if the business cycle is to be stabilized. For the authors to suggest, then, that Keynes discovered the role of monetary policy is preposterous and any such notion would have been rejected by Lord Keynes.

Finally, the authors adopt a stagnation thesis typical of the most dismal forebodings of the thirties, completely neglecting the massive postwar evidence of the dynamic properties of private capital formation and disregarding the successful revival of "orthodox" monetary policy throughout the Western world in recent years.

In fact, there is hardly a page of this book that reflects either intellectual or pragmatic experience of the problems or literature of economics since January 1936.

The authors' cavalier treatment of non-Keynesian literature, best exemplified by their fantastic précis of the quantity theory of money (p. 100) in conjunction with their disdainful, though muddled, exposition of the classical theory of costs and prices, lead to a totally misleading picture of the history, theory and policy of economic science. It is regrettable, therefore, that *Economics and Action* has received the imprimatur of an international scientific organization.

M. L. BURSTEIN

Cold Look at a New Gadget

The United Nations: Planned Tyranny, by V. Orval Watts. Foreword by Clarence Manion. 149 pp. New York: Devin-Adair. \$3.00

The UN Record, by Chesly Manly. 256 pp. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. \$3.95.

Once the United Nations is mentioned, the Liberals' vaunted open-mindedness turns into an impatient, intolerant, inflexible and inhuman dogmatism. Even the scholar in the field of international organization, therefore, must not approach the UN as an objective study. He is received into the experts' ranks only as he makes his declaration of faith, pledges the UN his loyal support, and covenants to live by the norms of internationalism which serve as the modern intellectual's code of ethics.

The literature of the UN, including public speeches, consists largely of incantations of a blind but nonetheless determined confidence in the UN: "Something for which mankind has had a yearning ever since the dawn of history"; "the town meeting of the world"; "the moral power of world opinion"; "the majority of right"; "our best hope for success"; "the combined force of the community of nations," and so on. Liberalism, which at least in its youth started out with a robust suspicion of government, even democratic government, has uncondition-

ally surrendered to the mere vision of a quasi-government among nations.

We are asked, in consequence, to give our unquestioning support to something that calls itself a society, an organization, and a political body. Is every kind of unity praiseworthy? Then let us praise, not only the United States, but also the societies of Hitler and Stalin. Is peace always valuable? Then let us value, along with well-ordered social systems, the peace of Jenghiz Khan. Is cooperation always good? Then, by all means, let us hasten to cooperate with the Al Capones, the Bugsy Siegels, and the politburos of Communist states. But if, as our best authorities have taught us, political institutions (above all, novel and untried ones) should be judged by the yardstick of the *good life*, then let us look coldly at this fledgling among governments and ask what fruits it produces that are worth the price we pay for it.

In the teeth of Liberal opposition, a counterbalancing body of opinion on the UN is now emerging, supported increasingly by serious and sober work. Unbiased and skilled observers like the late Robert Byfield are vivisectioning the United Nations for the benefit of U.S. citizens. And the two books reviewed here are part of the small but growing literature that embodies such opinion in opposition to the Liberal orthodoxy in this field. Orval Watts sets forth his fears that the United Nations is in sober truth an evolving world government which, when fully grown, would be hideously dictatorial. His is only a statement of one man's opinion, but by no means a worse or less well founded opinion than the equally subjective judgments on the United Nations in which Liberal books abound.

Chesly Manly's book is more factual. For many years, he was the *Chicago Tribune's* reporter on UN affairs. Drawing upon his close familiarity with UN personalities and procedures, he combines many penetrating observations into a clear picture of the UN's ineffectiveness and the extent to which it has been penetrated by the Left. Roughly half of his book deals with the record of UN activities; the other half with the record of infiltration into UN personnel.

Both books partake somewhat of the basic defect of the Liberal literature on the subject, namely: they tend to

claim too much knowledge about the United Nations. Liberals assert that the UN can maintain peace or reduce tensions. Their opponents affirm that the UN will result in world-wide socialism or world government. Both views get presented mainly in a context of insufficient real knowledge. What we need is more competent and scholarly analysis of this new gadget in the arsenal of politics. Meanwhile, let us welcome any contribution that offsets the fiercely intolerant one-sidedness that Liberals have forced upon us as the official approach to UN problems.

GERHART NIEMEYER

Impressive Example

The Mind of Napoleon: a Selection from His Written and Spoken Words, edited and translated by J. Christopher Herold. 322 pp. New York: Columbia University Press. \$5.00

The great generals of the world's history form three distinct groups that have little in common except military genius. Alexander and Jenghiz Khan, for instance, were the incarnation of daimonic forces that somehow made small nations expand with explosive violence; Hannibal and MacArthur were brilliant strategists in the service of governments whose policies they could not control; Caesar and Napoleon made foreign conquest the means of domestic revolution and the basis of personal despotism. Of these two self-made monarchs, Napoleon is, perhaps, the more remarkable and instructive figure, for he possessed neither the cold intellectual superior-

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ity nor the warm personal charm of the man who mastered and ended the Roman Republic.

Here, preceded by a lucid and judicious introduction, is a well-chosen and well-arranged collection of representative utterances. The translations that I have checked are accurate, and the editor has shown admirable discretion and restraint in his use of such slippery sources as Las Casas and O'Meara, limiting himself to excerpts which most historians will accept as certainly or probably authentic, and scrupulously indicating in the notes the source of each quotation. This book is indispensable to anyone who wishes, without going to the voluminous and often labyrinthic sources, to understand one of history's most impressive examples of the ruthless application of genius to politics.

R. P. O.

Undisciplined Disciplinarian

Man's Emerging Mind, by N. J. Berrill.
308 pp. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company. \$4.00

Every scientist who, disturbed by the emptiness of his scientific world, is impelled to search for some deeper meaning seems to find it necessary to rush into print with his philosophical discoveries.

Professor Berrill's is a typical example. An embryologist and a member of the Royal Society, he is undoubtedly most distinguished in his profession. But to his endeavor to found an ontology and an ethics upon his evolutionary view of human development, he brings nothing but an engaging personality, a creditable reverence for things beyond the reach of science and an inquiring mind. He shows not the slightest consciousness that the questions with which he deals demand a discipline at least as rigorous as does his own embryology, and have a long and honorable history of discussion. He can write, for example, of the problem of time with no seeming awareness of the thought of Augustine or Kant or anyone between or since. And so with all the other philosophic problems upon which he touches.

The result is what might be expected—loose, sophomoric and pretentious.

F. S. M.

I have been reading NATIONAL REVIEW each week with growing interest. I like your militant attitude and a kind of youthfulness of spirit which is rare in these days, when too many conservatives have grown weary and discouraged. You not only say what you think, but you are not afraid to say it in good English. . . . If something is not done about it, our language will soon be as obsolete as Chaucer's. That is why I am doubly grateful to you (both editors and contributors) for trying to keep alive this wonderful English language, with its great range and power and subtlety; and I admire you for your mastery of the deadly weapons of wit and humor, which can be so devastating to our enemies. Thank you, and God bless you!

New York City

MARY REISNER

Your magazine gives us more satisfaction than any other modern reading. Our authors, seemingly, must be guided by concepts descended from Marx, or lay aside their pens. I am of the latter. Which is not so much due to the outright propagandist as it is to disease carriers who sneeze germs wherever their employment lies. The diseased night-crawlers may be isolated; the immune carriers are difficult to detect. NATIONAL REVIEW will cause many a reader to bring himself up sharply with: "Am I spreading the Marxian concept, or am I not? By Jove, perhaps I am. I never thought about it. Can it be I'm sneezing a fatal disease, the first symptom of which is a numbness inside the skull?"

New York City

ASA WILGUS

NATIONAL REVIEW is one magazine which really is read here in the Friary Library [Siena College]. "The Strange Case of Dr. Dooley" was a masterpiece. It was worth the price of a subscription. And who else would have had the courage to publish this story?

FR. JOHN J. MANNING, O.F.M.
Loudonville, N. Y.

Please accept my sincere wishes for [NATIONAL REVIEW's] success. God knows it is high time, not, we hope, too late, for publications articulating the inherently conservative views of the American majority.

Richmond, Va.

K. V. HOFFMAN

To the Editor

Congratulations! Your new magazine is a sound and strong bulwark against this spreading-chestnut-tree pseudo liberalism.

Jackson Heights, N.Y. MRS. JAMES CHAPLIN

I did so enjoy "Hunting Birds—and Bucks" by F. R. Buckley. It was a good article and please give us more. Hunting is a sickness. In this day and age an unnecessary activity. So much damage is done to farms, ranches, etc. Help us to fight federal aid to this group.

Provo, Utah

EDWARD W. BENTLEY

On page 5 of the December 7 issue you use words that will be interpreted in a different way from what you probably intended. You say, "there is no science of human action." One of the principal branches of the study of human behavior is economics. Surely quite a few laws—positive relations between cause and effect—have been discovered in the economic field, and where we find natural laws, we find a science.

Your venture has my admiration.

San Francisco, Cal.

GEORGE P. SHAMER

Your new magazine is magnificent . . . Every single word of the [first] three editions has been devoured by me and I find: I like the cover with its blue border; your refusal to ram any particular ideas down our throats but to let us make up our minds; NATIONAL REVIEW's versatility of articles; and the timeliness, the appeal and high quality. Well, you can tell I'm sold.

Miami, Fla.

MARY LESTER

I endorse Mr. Lewis O. Anderson's suggestion in your letters column (December 28) that the word "liberal" in its popular, but debased, sense should be enclosed in quotation marks. Thus one might distinguish such "liberals" from the Liberals who precipitated the American and French revolutions as a means of enhancing the dignity of the individual through reducing his . . . subservience to the monolithic state.

Today's "liberals" want to "free" man by making him more and more dependent on the federal bureaucracy. . .

Washington, D.C.

JOHN C. WILLIAMSON

Moscow's Primary Target is U. S. Business

"Communist world domination," Lenin once said, "is impossible without the violent destruction of the machinery of the capitalistic state."

Lenin's eyes, even then, were on the United States. What he meant was that so long as the resources and production of America were strong the free world would remain too tough to gobble up.

Our industrial and business institutions, small and large, are the hard core of our "capitalistic state" so hateful to the Communists. Hence, the Kremlin works day and night within our borders to put us out of business. Depression within the U.S. is the eternal mission of Moscow . . .

By advocating ruinous taxes upon business; by infiltrating unions and fostering costly strikes; by supporting legislation to throttle fresh investment and industrial expansion; by creating frictions and distrust between business and the public.

The Communist organs within our midst establish the platform and tell the story week by week for all to read and ponder.

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destroy the foundations upon which the company stands. Among other things it uses part of its advertising budget for this purpose. *We believe it's good business.*

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